GLOBALIZATION,
MORAL JUSTIFICATION, AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE
Charles Garofalo
Department of Public
Administration
Southwest Texas State
University
This article argues that there
is a profound connection between the public service and moral justification. In
this age of globalization, it further argues that public administration would
be wise to build on a global ethic. The
author argues against a compartmentalized perspective on ethics and in favor of
a unity perspective as presented in Garofalo, C. and D. Geuras. 1999.
Ethics in the Public Service: The Moral Mind at Work (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press).
Both popular and
academic literature has amply addressed the scope and complexity of
globalization, its assumptions, goals, strictures, and processes. Issues associated with human rights, labor
conditions and compensation, environmental protection, national sovereignty,
poverty, investment patterns and productivity are among the many concerns
embedded in the broad theme of globalization.
Analysts from a number of disciplines and political persuasions approach
globalization from a variety of perspectives.
Often they see globalization as either the inevitable next step in human
progress or the evil free-trade juggernaut that threatens the future of most of
humanity. What they tend to omit from
these discussions, however, is an explicit concern for the underlying moral
basis and justification for globalization and the particular role of public
administrators across the planet.
Therefore, the aim of
this article is to offer a moral framework for judging global policies,
programs, and practices. This article
shall delineate the responsibility of public administrators in a process of
justification and public reason grounded in a universal, unified ethic. Such a framework applies to all political,
economic, and governance premises and processes, whether global or not. Globalization simply focuses the issues more
sharply and spotlights the need for institutionalized processes of
deliberation, dialogue, and disclosure.
It also brings into clear focus the importance of justification and
reason based on substantive moral content.
John McMurtry’s (1998)
Unequal
Freedoms: The Global Market as an
Ethical System demonstrates the need for establishing and elaborating a moral
framework for globalization and a system of justification. McMurtry focuses on the underlying values
that drive globalization, including what he refers to as the value program in
which assertions such as “We must compete in the new global marketplace” are
seen as given, natural, unalterable. As
McMurtry states, in a value program
All people enact its prescriptions and functions as
presupposed norms of what they should do.
All assume its value designations and value exclusions as givens. They seek only to climb its ladder of
available positions to achieve their deserved reward as their due. Lives are valued, or not valued, in terms of
the system’s differentials and measurements.
All fulfill its specified roles without question and accept its costs,
however widespread, as unavoidable manifestations of reality (p. 6).
According to McMurtry,
the value program underlying the global market system consists of “efficiency
of factor allocation, comparative advantage, increased export earnings, rise in
market share, increased GDP performance and annual incomes, and, above all,
vastly increased returns on investment in an area of chronic under investment”
(p. 8). The master assumption is that
the global market system is superior to any other. The underlying premise is that the private sector is efficient
and the government is inefficient.
Thus, “whatever the market does is good, and whatever government does is
bad, unless it can be shown to serve the market” (p. 28).
The value program of
globalization is a closed system of choice, which the acquisition of money
drives society and the impact on the civil commons is either ignored or
discounted. But, as McMurtry asks, “if
the common interest is not protected and advanced by government as distinct
from the global market’s demands, then what is left to serve the shared
life-interests of society? What becomes
of community goods which are not priced and by their nature can only be
safeguarded or provided by government?” (p. 21). In McMurtry’s view, there is no publicly accountable institution
that can protect civil society other than government. Therefore, government’s protection of the civil commons is the
moral responsibility of public administrators, including their role in
formulating, explaining, and justifying the moral choices inherent in global
governance.
Douglas Yates (1981)
argues that the American bureaucrat plays a preeminent role in public policy
making. The bureaucrat chooses public
policy values and makes hard choices when values conflict. Scholars have paid little attention,
however, to the justification of the bureaucrat’s value choices. Therefore, Yates calls for discussion of
values in our “bureaucratic democracy” and of what is involved in choosing
those values so that a dialogue can provide citizens the knowledge and
information needed to make intelligent judgments about the process of
governance.
Yates maintains that
being elected and responding to constituents’ interests exempts elected
officials form value accounting.
Bureaucrats, by contrast, lack this legitimacy, and, thus, justification
of their policy decisions is necessary.
An assessment of the implications of policy for major public values such
as liberty, equality, community, and the public interest should be part of the
answer to the question of “what should government do?” However, Yates is not optimistic that such
an assessment would be helpful in offering clearer choices, illuminating policy
dilemmas, and otherwise informing citizens.
He, therefore, offers
a more modest approach to value clarification.
He argues that where value conflicts are great and the accounting
problems substantial, public officials should provide a value analysis that
informs its citizens and thus realizes a democratic control of
administration. Another reason for
value accounting, which seems to belie Yates’ pessimism about assessing the
policy-values nexus, is the lack of a clear or coherent justification or set of
justifications for government intervention.
According to Yates, the lack a firmly rooted public philosophy, which
means that virtually no restraints or normative principles exist to guide
governmental action or inaction. He
claims that, as a result, bureaucrats qua policymakers make value
choices and implicitly fashion new rationales and precedents for government
intervention.
To adapt Yates’ call
for justification of bureaucratic choice to the global level requires
consideration of justification and public reason together, for they go
hand-in-hand in elaborating and extending the kind of value analysis and
accounting that Yates advocates.
Several writers combine justification and public reason into “public justification”. Fred D’Agostino (1996), for example, suggests that public justification, which he
claims is “the key idea in contemporary liberal-democratic political theory,”
means “no regime is legitimate unless it is reasonable from every individual’s
point of view.” Furthermore, he notes
that several theorists want to know how, “the ideal of public justification is
to be properly articulated.” For
example, Johns Rawls, “the foremost exponent of the idea of public
justification,” according to D’Agostino, takes a more or less empirical position
in determining reasonable from every individual’s point of view. Others, such as Gerald Gaus, tend to take a
normative position. Thus, for Rawls,
legitimacy requires actual agreement, while for Gaus “reasonable” means
supported by good reasons.
D’Agostino (1996)
points out that with the Rawlsian position, “there is some danger that regimes
will be judged legitimate which are supported only or mainly by ‘bad’ reasons –
i.e., which depend for their ‘legitimacy’ on mistaken beliefs or morally
inadmissible desires and preferences.”
He goes on and says that the Gausian position is a “demonstrations of
legitimacy may not be practically efficacious – i.e., they may need to be
supplemented by forceful impositions of requirements which, while supported by
‘good reasons’, are not actually accepted by the individuals concerned”. He concludes that much work concerns “the
degree to which these competing demands – of ‘practical efficacy’ and
‘morality’ – can be balanced to yield some public conception of public justification.
D’Agostino (1996) also
highlights what he calls three especially important ambiguities concealed by
the phrase “reasonable from the point of view of every individual:”
·
Empirical/normative;
·
Consensus/convergence;
·
Maximizing/universalizing.
With respect to the empirical/ normative ambiguity, D’Agostino’s
concern is with the fact that, empirically, we deal with actual beliefs and
desires. We are not concerned with
which are better informed, less selfish, and more committed. Instead, we accept or respect actual ways of
reasoning, however defective they might be, as well as actual levels of
evidential and inferential adequacy.
Normatively, he suggests two counts of vulnerability:
“it presupposes an accessibly univocal reading of
what it is reasonable to believe and desire and to infer from one’s beliefs and
desires with respect to public political arrangements”
“a normative approach seems to abandon an important
guiding principle of justificationist accounts of legitimacy – to wit, their responsiveness
to broadly ‘voluntaristic’ considerations”
In reference to the second ambiguity –
consensus/convergence, D’Agostino (1996) focuses on the phrase “reasonable from
every point of view”. He posits that we
might read this phrase as invoking either the notion of a consensus or a
convergence. If consensus, then members
of a community share grounding reasons as their justification of the
regime. If convergence, then they base
their justification for a regime using the different reasons held by members of
the community.
On the third ambiguity
– maximizing/universalizing, D’Agostino claims that different modalities of
reason are involved. From a maximizing
conception, an individual might consider a regime legitimate if it maximally
advances that individual’s interests.
On the other hand, from a universalizing point of view, an individual
might consider a regime legitimate if it advances the interests of all seen
from that individual’s perspective. The
first position suggests individuals thinking as private agents about their
individual welfare; the second position suggests individuals thinking about the
common good.
The central issue
appears to revolve around the determination of an adequate conception of public
justification, including balancing competing interpretations and demands. D’Agostino (1996) points to the difficulty
of identifying a trade-off among the various desiderata associated with public
justification. He suggests that the
prospects for public justification, therefore, are poor. He speculates that the postmodernists may be
right, “in claiming that notions of legitimacy are inherently and inescapably
themselves instruments of power, rather than ‘rational’ alternatives to force”. He contends that, “if there is no public
conception of public justification, any regime is ‘legitimate’ only given a conception of legitimacy
that is itself controversial, and hence can be imposed only by force-not by the
inducements of ‘reason’ “.
D’Agostino is
skeptical about the rational basis of justification and legitimacy. Nonetheless, the aim here is to demonstrate
that such a basis can be identified and applied to public policies, programs,
and practices, even on the global level.
More specifically, the application of the unified ethic, as developed by
Charles Garofalo and Dean Geuras (1999) in Ethics in the Public Service: The Moral Mind at Work, resolves the problems with
justification, whether at the regime or policy level. The foundation of the unified ethic is the integration of deontology,
teleology, and virtue ethics. This is
contrary to the conventional compartmentalization of Kantianism,
utilitarianism, virtue ethics or the compartmentalization of principles,
consequences, and character. This
unity, in fact, constitutes a single indissoluble entity that mirrors the unity
of human nature. This, in turn, can
inform our judgment and enable us to apply it to particular cases with
intelligence, integrity, and consistency.
It can guide our decisions and help us justify them on both empirical
and normative grounds.
Consider the three ambiguities noted by D’Agostino
·
Empirical/normative;
·
Consensus/convergence; and
·
Maximizing/universalizing.
Approached from the perspective of the unified ethic, these ambiguities
dissolve. If, for example, we find on
the empirical level defective reasoning or selfishness, we have in the unified
ethic an integrated moral basis for judging it. The artificial separation of principle, purpose, and virtue does
not hamper us. On the normative level,
the unified ethic does not represent a univocal interpretation of reasonable
beliefs, desires, and political arrangements.
On the contrary, it is grounded in human nature and out innate need for
integrity. It goes beyond purely
self-interest-driven beliefs and desires by precluding the purely self-interest
– driven distortions.
The second ambiguity –
consensus/convergence – is equally vulnerable to the value of the unified ethic
as a moral lodestar. Whether citizens
support a policy for the same reasons or for different reasons, their support
originates in their shared normal point of view. Finally, the third ambiguity – maximizing/universalizing – is
clearly a revised version of the hoary conflict between individual utility and
the common good. The unified ethic,
while allowing for individual freedom, promotes a balance between our personal
interests and the needs of the polity.
Thus, the unified
ethic implies reforming the process of public justification and, indeed,
decision making from an either-or approach to one that dissolves dualism by
creating an integrated, coherent whole.
In policy this integrated approach is especially beneficial. As Garofalo and Geuras (1999) indicate in
discussing the application of ethical theories to unity, “Once they are
understood in conformity with each other and applied to a case in mutual
consistency, the ethical act can be reasonably explained in a comprehensive
manner. The explanation, if compelling,
elicits agreements from its audience, be they supervisors, subordinates, the
public that is served, or their representative, defends the moral agent from
charges of arbitrariness or worse; and serves as a model for other decisions
and moral agents” (p. 129).
Justification is
complicated by a number of factors, including balancing competing values and
claims, defining what is reasonable to diverse individuals and groups, and
identifying what is to be justified or legitimated. Nevertheless, despite these complications, in a democracy, we
expect public officials to explain and justify their policies, programs, and
practice, which they design and implement, with moral reasoning. As Yates (1981) says, “the first obligation
of the appointive official or bureaucrat is to be explicit about the value premises and
implications of public decisions” (p. 306).
For our purposes,
justification of public policies, programs, and practices, as well as the
conditions that result, can occur on two levels: the level of McMurtry’s value
program or the level of policies either on the agenda or actually in
force. Although bureaucratic choices
consciously occur on the second level, the first level provides helpful
perspective and context for understanding bureaucratic justification. Therefore, we will review the major features
of McMurtry’s value program before turning to the policies, programs, and
practices in contemporary global public administration.
We recall that, by
value program, McMurtry means the unconsciously held, presupposed norms and
assumptions that govern our political and economic choices and actions. In the market system, he argues, one of the
fundamental assumptions is the right to private property, which contemporary
society considers given or natural.
McMurtry maintains, however, that contrary to this aspect of the value
program, the right to private property is not natural. Instead, it is a moral
institution open to choice and rejection, an ancient and profound moral issue.
Moreover, McMurtry
implicitly raises questions about the limits of private property. If it is not limited, private property can
be disastrous for whole societies such as Native peoples, Third World
agricultural communities, and company towns.
Nonetheless, he contends the market system rules out any limit on
inequality of wealth or any dispossession of other people’s means of life by
profit maximization. Still, in spite of
these outcomes, McMurtry characterizes the market as a moral system, at least
in its own terms. “If we think of a
moral system as a set of principles held to prevent harm and promote good, with
penalties and consequence of violations of its principles or laws, clearly the
market order is a moral system” (p. 54).
In McMurtry’s value
program, the ultimate and unifying value of market doctrine is individual
freedom, which is, “the supreme and universal value from which market theory
and practice derive their ethical force and meaning” (p. 54). Government should be neutral, although the
market conception of what is good is in the government’s province to
enforce. For example, while government
is not to interfere in the market, the first duty of government is to ensure
the security of property rights, free exchanges, and profit opportunities.
Government, which is
the market’s delegate in this regard, is legitimate only to the extent that it
represents private producers and consumers.
With respect to freedom, McMurtry observes that market theory and its
declaration of human freedom appear to be contradictory. “Market theory,” he notes, “rules out any
human or social responsibility for the laws of the market, for they are prior
to and independent of society, as are laws of nature and God” (p. 73). But, then, he asks: “How can people be self-determining
if they have no voice, say, or responsibility in the most basic principles of
the way their society produces and distributes their means of live?” (p.
73). The answer is that so-called free
choices must rest within the market’s moral commandments. As McMurtry notes, “this value program is
the unseen moral absolutism of our age” (p.62).
With McMurtry’s value
program as a backdrop, we now turn to the key issues confronting global
institutions today. Although
economists, journalists, development specialists, and others, such as Korten
(1995), Mander and Goldsmith (1996), and Grieder (1997) discussed these issues,
they are especially salient for public administrators who must adjudicate among
them on a daily basis. For example, Ali
Farazmand (1999) highlights several global challenges facing public
administration, including public-private sector relations. He argues that, “change in the character and
activities of the state and of public administration from ‘civil administration
to non-civil administration,’”” privatization, and elitism combine to challenge
“the human conscience of the public administration community” (pp.517-519).
With respect to the
changing configuration of the public and private spheres, Farazmand (1999)
maintains that, with the increasing dominance of the corporate sector,
government’s role, “in the allocation of resources, the equitable distribution
of wealth, the stabilization of economy, and economic growth has been overruled
by the globalizing corporate elites” (p. 517).
As a result, the public sphere and citizen participation has
shrunk. Therefore, “public
administrators should resist shrinking this realm of public service by engaging
citizens in the administration of public affairs and by playing a proactive
role in managing societal resources away from the dominant control of
globalizing corporate elites” (p. 517).
In Farazmand’s view, nothing less than the future legitimacy of public
administrators is at stake.
The second challenge –
the shift from civil administration to non-civil administration – is even
larger. According to Farazmand, the
traditional administrative state balanced corporate elite interests with broad
public interests, but now “the balanced administrative state has been replaced
by the corporate-coercive state” (p. 517).
Thus, public administration is being transformed from administering
public affairs to administering the public itself, “for social control and
facilitation of capital accumulation” (p. 517). Public administrators with a social conscience, he argues, should
resist this change.
Third is the challenge
of privatization, which Farazmand claims “promotes greater opportunities for
corruption” (p. 518). “Public
administrators,” he contends, “must resist the market-based concepts of
treating citizens as consumers and degrading them to market commodities” (p.
518). Fourth is globalization’s
tendency to promote elitism and elites who operate as subsidiaries or agents of
transnational corporations. Many of
these “corporate mercenaries” in less-developed nations “run repressive regimes
which violate the human rights of their own people” (p. 518). The paradox is that, “globalization has
produced a massive concentration of corporate power and has centralized its
organizational structure while at the same time governmental decentralization
has been promoted across the world” (p. 518).
Finally, Farazmand
asserts that, “globalization challenges the human conscience of the public
administration community” (p. 519).
Public administrators, who are “professional citizens of the global
community,” are responsible for addressing many moral issues, “including the
conditions and deprivations of the poor, wage slavery and sweatshops in global
factories, environmental destruction, global warming, and inequity and
injustice” (p. 519). Public
administrators can raise global consciousness about global issues, “question
the sincerity of the elites, oppose exploitation, and resist being used for
undemocratic, unjust, and inequitable purposes around the globe” (p. 519). Farazmand suggests that the Internet and
other communication systems can be helpful in this regard. The upshot of Farazmand’s position is that
public administrators in both more- and less- developed nations are guardians
of global community interests who “have a global responsibility to act
ethically and morally in a coordinated manner” (p. 519).
McMurtry’s value
program and Farazmand’s challenges represent the background and foreground,
respectively, of contemporary global public administration. Together, they constitute the environment
within which ethically conscious public administrators can play a dual role:
they can set a moral example within their own institutions through
justification of their value choices, and they can press for inclusion of
policy and program justification in their institutions as a whole.
The unified ethic
summarized in this essay and Nigel Dower’s (1998) world ethic, which expresses
the unified ethic and includes a set of universal values applicable to all
people and a set of global obligations that link all people, should animate
such public administrators. They should
combine their conscience and commitment with moral coherence and conviction to
effectuate a strategic moral vision exemplified by the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Such
public administrators would subscribe to what Dower calls the cosmopolitan
position, the core of which “is a belief that in the lat analysis all human
beings live in one ‘moral community’ and that any form of organization at any
level has to be assessed in terms of how well it allows or enables human beings
to achieve well-being and moral agency” (p. 185).
For Dower (1998) rights are critical not only to the attainment of
life’s basic necessities but also “to what assures dignity and the exercise of
rational autonomy” (p. 146). Dower
argues for distinguishing between justified and unjustified negative effects of
action, and that “either the idea of unjustified policies takes us back to more
specific canons of fairness and justice . . . liberty, non-coercion,
non-deception or it points us to a principle of not either directly or
indirectly causing extreme suffering/poverty, a state of affairs below a
minimum level of acceptability, as a basic principle” (pp. 147-148). Dower concludes that, “this cannot be an
absolute principle, since there are many other
Important goals of public policy with which it will clash, but it needs
to be seen as an ever pressing consideration” (pp. 147-148).
Yet, even if committed
in principle to Dower’s world ethic, the morally and globally conscious public
administrator doubtless would ask how such an ethic can be realized, given the
level of moral sophistication and conviction prevalent in most public
institutions. Such an administrator
would be sensitive to the strategic and tactical dimensions of justification,
as well as its moral importance and implications, and would wonder how to act,
to paraphrase Farazmand, in a morally coordinated manner. Therefore, a recommendation for
institutionalizing justification of value choices in public administration must
build upon but go beyond Yates’ prescription by providing some guidance to
administrators in their search for morally grounded decisions and actions. This is the role of the unified ethic.
As noted, the unified ethic
is a concatenation of the major ethical strands in philosophy-deontology,
teleology, and virtue. Together, they
can provide the public administrator moral clarity, coherence, and consistency. These qualities, in turn, can empower the
administrator in both thought and action and engender morally informed
justification of decisions and actions.
Bureaucrats would no longer have value choices hidden behind decisions
as fragmented, with principles, consequences, and character considered as
separate categories. Instead, the
embodiment of the integrated ethic, imagined and implemented by autonomous and
accountable moral agents, experts, and stewards of the public interest would
articulate those choices.
We can translate this
combination of philosophical and functional perspectives into morally grounded
and skilled value choices and decisions through institutional support,
training, and leadership. Organizations
such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
the World Trade Organization, and the World Health Organization, are the forum
in which we can address the justification of global policies, programs, and
practices. They, other international
forums, and the court of world opinion adjudicate the value choices behind those
policies, programs, and practices.
At the same time, we
must acknowledge the obstacles to creating and sustaining this process of
justification. As Jane Davis (1986)
notes, “international institutions may be suitable arenas in which to attempt
to raise the moral consciousness of member states and their respective publics,
but in reality they are somewhat less conspicuous for effective, practical
implementation of agreed policies” (p. 161).
Nonetheless, we must also acknowledge, as Davis observes, that
North-South decision-making processes are infused with moral issues and that
the North-South debate is replete with such notions as justice, equality,
rights, and obligations. Therefore,
despite the amorality and immorality that some associate with international
relations, the idea of introducing moral considerations into global decision
making is not new. It is, instead, a
persistent matter of political will, moral courage, and a commitment to begin.
The principal purpose
of public reason and justification is to advance democratic deliberation and
decision-making. Although the process
is imperfect and limited in its application, the ideal can inspire all
governments and global institutions.
Clearly, however, realizing this practice is difficult. Ideological, instrumental, and cultural
considerations, among others, obstruct progress toward intelligent and moral
global policy making and lead many to concur with the adage that morality has
no place in politics. Still, in one way
or another, morality persists in intruding into the political and bureaucratic
realms, leaving us to wonder, some say naively, about the prospects for a
different, more humane, form of politics and government.
Richard Dagger (1986)
argues that there are two ways to conceive of politics. The first is to see politics as an activity
involving competition for power and advantage, advancing interests, usually at
an opponent’s expense, but essentially it is merely a strategic business. From this standpoint, accusations of
“playing politics” or acting from “purely political” motives are
appropriate. But if this were all there
is to politics, then these would not be accusations. To accuse someone of playing politics is to charge impropriety,
which Dagger maintains would be absurd if politics were only a competition for
power and advantage.
The second way to
conceive of politics is to see it as a fundamentally ethical enterprise in
which we use strategy but it must always be subordinate to the larger
requirement of the public interest.
Politics is an ethical enterprise because political questions and
decisions force us to consider how we are to order our lives as individuals and
our life as a community. In politics,
we are ultimately concerned with an ethos, a way of life. Thus, if politics is fundamentally ethical,
we cannot justify political conduct on the basis of strategic
considerations. “Political
justification,” according to Dagger, “is a form of ethical justification,”
requiring a compelling theory of ethics (p. 271).
The universal, unified
ethic is, as it’s least, a compelling theory that can guide our
decision-making. As an integrated moral
and philosophical structure, the universal, unified ethic can provide a moral
foundation and moral legitimacy to global dialogue and decisions. It can help us understand the nature and the
implications of those decisions for the billions of global citizens whose
voices are never heard in the boardrooms, courtrooms, and other inner sanctums
of power and privilege.
At the same time,
however, the universal, unified ethic, alone, is certainly not sufficient to
alter entrenched perspectives and practices.
Reformers will require other approaches as well. For example, just as OECD members were
pressed to adopt more aggressive anti-corruption measures, so too might the
public influence global institutions to recognize the underlying moral nature
to institutional policies and to promote more democratic decision making
processes. Public justification, as
Stephen Macedo (1990) says, is not simply a philosophical or intellectual
exercise. It is, instead, an attempt to
create “a transparent, demystified social order” (p. 295). The universal, unified ethic can be a vital
ingredient in that effort.
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