P.A.
ETH-TALK: IS IT ETHICAL?
David John Farmer
Department of Political
Science and Public Administration
Virginia Commonwealth
University
The study and discussion of ethics in public
administration can be dysfunctional and even harmful without a sophisticated
understanding of the field and ethics.
This article stresses that those engaged in discussing ethics should
understand epistemology, focus on the practical, and be very circumspect about
imposing a particular ethical prescriptive on others.
P.A. eth-talk (the study and discussion of Public Administration ethics) can be dysfunctional, and it is harmful to public administration practice and thinking-ethics properly being at the heart of the p.a. discipline-not to identify the criteria that can distinguish healthy from dysfunctional eth-talk. This paper illustrates these two claims by discussing three among the minimal criteria that healthy P.A. eth-talk should meet. Most of this material was published earlier (e.g., Farmer, 1995, 1999). The first criterion is that healthy P.A. eth-talk should be realistic in its recognition of the epistemological nature of the ethical, and that ethics that are unrealistic are dysfunctional. Second, healthy eth-talk should be comprehensively practical, avoiding a constricted view of practicality. Third, healthy eth-talk should incorporate a hesitant posture toward imposing ethical prescriptions on others. A practical implication of this paper is that, wonderful as the ethical revival has been in the pat decade or so in American Public Administration, we should think through the institutional need to distinguish between healthy and dysfunctional eth-talk.
The motive in raising these issues is three-fold. First, the shift toward recognizing the role of the ethical in P.A. and in related fields is accepted as a step forward. (For myself, I rejoice at the growing interest in P.A. eth-talk. My own view is that we cannot live well or think well without making moral judgments.) This shift toward recognizing the role of the ethical, affecting a range of social action disciplines, is exemplified recently in the United States in the revival of interest in social philosophy especially since the publication in 1971 of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971); it is also found in the justice emphasis in Derrida (Derrida, 1992) and in the postmodern view of the implosion of the boundaries between the normative, the scientific and the aesthetic (Habermas, 1983). Second, the step – although forward – is a mis-step if it seizes on a version of the ethicizing project that is not realistic about the nature of the ethical, not comprehensive about practicality, and not willing to be hesitant in imposing ethical prescriptions on others. Third, I want to bring these ideas before a wider audience. This is why I am repeating much – for example – from an earlier version of a paper that became Farmer, 1999, modified by some recent thoughts.
Two caveats should be
entered. First, there is nothing wrong
with P.A. eth-talk options that do not apply to eth-talk in other action areas,
e.g., business or social work administration.
The arguments of this paper could be generalized beyond P.A. eth-talk. It applies in any situation where there are
differences in opinion about ethics, e.g., in any multi-opinion or
multi-cultural situation. My choice to
focal on P.A. eth-talk results only from the fact that I am interested in
P.A. (Incidentally, use of the
neologism “eth-talk” is “inspired” by, and adapted from, an e-mail address used
in the ASPA Section on Ethics. However,
the adaptation – including a hyphen – is to underscore that the excellent work
of that section is not being targeted.)
Second, there is nothing in this paper that is intended either to undermine
religion or to support relativism. As
is noted below, my own skepticism about the capability of human reasoning “on
its own” to identify grounded, inter-subjective moral prescriptions is
understood to be in the spirit of St. Augustine. I think that, no less than St. Augustine, a religious person
could happily accept the skepticism offered here (understanding “skepticism” in
its philosophical sense and not confusing skepticism with pessimism) and
practice her religion without contradiction.
In fact, St. Augustine would have considered anything else as
misguided.
Healthy P.A. eth-talk – a sub-set of ethics practiced in administrating public agencies and taught to public administrators – is one that can cope with that I have called “the epistemological indefiniteness of the ethical.” A first criterion for healthy ethical thinking and practice is a recognition of the unavailability of inter-subjective grounding and certainty, based solely on the claims of reason. P.A. eth-talk is dysfunctional to the extent that it demands certainty where certainty is elusive. Growing recognition of the inaccessibility of grounding is illustrated in the hermeneutic turn described by Georgia Warnke, and recognition of the unavailability of certainty is supported by philosophers as diverse as St. Augustine and Bertrand Russell. Examples of dysfunctionality in P.A. ethics thinking are provided in the seeking of an illusion of certainty in such forms s core moral values and democratic constitutionalism.
A shift away from attempts to ground ethics is exemplified in Warnke’s discussion of what she calls a “hermeneutic or interpretive turn” in justice philosophizing. By the term “hermeneutic or interpretive turn,” Warnke means that “many important political theorists no longer try to justify principles of justice or norms of action on what might be called Kantian grounds; by appealing to formal reason, to the character of human action or to the neutral procedures of rational choice” (Warnke, 1993, p. vii). Rather, justifying social and political principles turn simply to showing the suitability of the principles of that society or to showing that the principles express the “meanings of the society’s goods and practices, history and traditions.” Even John Rawls has switched from offering Kantian or objective prescriptions. Instead, he now re-states what a society, a community, thinks is justice – what he calls the “settled convictions” of a society. Others taking the hermeneutic turn are Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor; the former speaks about “social understandings” and the latter about “inter-subjective meanings.” They re-state what a community thinks is justice. (In parentheses, it is agreed that these thinkers are trying to have their cake and eat it. Wisely, they are shying away from an objective “grounded” prescription and, then unfortunately seeking ersatz grounding in substitutes like settled convictions, social understandings and inter-subjective meanings.) This agreement is offered in parentheses, because the main point is that – despite the ersatz noted – a hermeneutic shift is made by these major thinkers. This shift meshes with the more forthright denial of the possibility of grounding, made by writers like Giorgio Agamben. “The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realize” (Agamben, 1993, p. 43).
Earlier the claim was made that
this skepticism about the possibility of inter-subjective grounded ethical
certainty, derived from reason alone, was in the spirit of St. Augustine’s
skepticism about the capabilities of unaided human reason. For example, see the section in his City of
God on “The disagreements of philosophers and the harmony of the
Scriptures.” For instance, he begins by
saying that “the philosophers themselves… do not seem to have had any other aim
in their laborious pursuits than to discover how we should regulate our lives
toward the attainment of happiness. How
is it, then, that disciples have disagreed with teachers, and fellow-disciples
with one another? Must it not be
because they sought the answers to these questions as men relying on human
senses and human powers of reasoning?”
(St. Augustine, 1467/1972, Bk XVIII, Ch. 41).
Philosophy’s value, for
thinkers like Bertrand Russell, is “largely in its very uncertainty” in knowing
(1959, p. 156). For him, “ (p)hilosophy
is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers. since no definite
answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the
questions themselves…” (Russell, 1959, p. 161). He goes on to describe the utility. He claims that philosophy can suggest possibilities, which
enlarge our thoughts and free us from “the tyranny of custom”. Philosophical conceptions can enlarge our
conception of what is possible, enrich our imagination and diminish the
dogmatic assurance that closes off our minds to speculations. In Russell’s view, practicing philosophy
renders the mind itself greater.
For further illustration of the
unavailability of certainty, consider again the large literature on justice
ethics and think of its inconclusive outcome (Farmer, 1998). That literature is full of excellent
arguments for contrary and contradictory views. Justice is analyzed in such divergent terms as retribution and
revenge, as mercy, as impartiality, and as reciprocity. One distinguished thinker argues for a
liberal theory of justice (Rawls, 1971); another advances a libertarian theory
(Nozick, 1974); and yet another wants to evaluate justice claims on a
utilitarian basis (Smart and Williams, 1973).
Each competing position has its strengths and weaknesses, and each has
its supporters; but surely there is no clear winner. Diverging views are also offered on whether justice is an
objective feature of what is; whether justice requires grounding in the divine,
or in reason, or in a language or a culture or a way of life; whether justice
needs any grounding; and so on. Some are cognitivsts, and others not (e.g.
Singer). Diverging views exist not only
on “whether: but also on “how” – for instance, how justice can be grounded in
reason.
This inconclusiveness of
outcomes, the unavailability of certainty, permeates ethics. Some are consequentialists (thinking about
results in such terms as long-lasting happiness or goodness), for example;
others are deontologists, denying consequentialism; others argue for or against
“balancing up” both options. Each of
the alternative has well-discussed weaknesses and strengths. Such inconclusiveness exists throughout
philosophy, not only in ethics but also in epistemology and metaphysics. This
is to be expected to be extent that it is right to conceptualize philosophy as
a “wild science” – a science structured by no decision rules that are beyond
questioning, a discipline fundamentally open.
To the extent that it fails to
recognize this indecisiveness, P.A. eth-talk is surely dysfunctional. There are two reasons for supposing a
measure of such dysfunctionality in P.A. eth-talk. First, it is reported that much teaching of P.A. ethics is not
within a philosophical framework (e.g., 18 percent, according to Catron and
Denhardt, 1994(; rather, the focus is on administrative ethics or role
morality. Too often, ethics are
conceptualized as if they could be reduced to a matter of technique. So, it can be lamented that missing from
P.A. ethics “is the kind of critical discourse and interchange that typifies a
good rousing Philosophical controversy” (Fox, 1994, p. 85).
Second, a significant theme in
P.A. ethics literature invokes false groundings that are sought in
dysfunctional ethics – in mis-using core values and democratic constitutionalism. For one, core values have been used in P.A.
ethical models over the past half-century to provide what is mis-supposed to be
grounding. Six or seven such models
claim that the public administrator has an ethical obligation to respect the
core values of her society (Denhardt, K., 1991).
Yes, societies have core
values. Yet it is a mistake to equate a
core societal value with an ethical value, i.e., with what ought to be. It is useful to repeat that it was a core
value of the pre-1865 Old South that people have a “right” to own others; it
was a core value of 1950s America that a woman’s place is in the home (Farmer,
1998a). But it should not be believed
that there was an ethical obligation – as opposed the best way to get ahead at
work and in polite society, responding to public opinion. A societal grip is not necessarily an
ethical grip.
Some seek certainty by equating
constitutional or regime values with ethical values. Some turn to the Constitution.
In response, Plato’s story of Socrates encountering Euthyphro bears
repeating. Euthyphro lets Socrates know
that, motivated by his wish to secure the gods’ approval, he (Euthyphro) has
laid murder charges against his own father, he thinks that he has done the
holy, the right, thing. Socrates then
asks (10a), “Is it holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it
because it is holy?” Turn to regime
ethics. Is it ethical because the
Constitution says so, or does the Constitution say so because it is ethical?
P.A. eth-talk should not attempt
to “rationalize” ethics by making certain what cannot be certain and by making
tidy what cannot be tidy at this time – on a kind of bureaucratic model. On the
contrary, we can embrace the uncertainties and the untidiness. In picturing justice and ethics, we can
admit of paradoxes, of tensions between claims, and of a sea of radical
indeterminacy. In P.A. eth-talk, we can
accept the realm of the ethical as it is – warts and all.
Healthy, P.A. eth-talk is one
that is comprehensively practical, avoiding a view that underemphasizes change
and the macro and long-range issues of bureaucracy. The urge for practicality, it is being suggested, is too narrow
when practicality is understood in such a way that it privileges the status quo
and the micro – practicality within the existing system. Yes, important P.A. eth-talk work has been –
and continues to be – done in the macro tradition (e.g., see Rohr, 1989;
Cooper, 1994). Yes, concern with the
micro concerns of ethical situations faced by employees in the existing
structure is valuable, and practitioners and students do enjoy hearing the such
issues as the “ethical responsibilities of public managers,” “tools for
personal decision making,” and “ethics and the agency” (e.g., Lewis,
1991). The dysfunctionality occurs when
there is overemphasis on the micro, when macro eth-talk issues are
shortchanged.
The point is whether it is
healthy to have a Public Administration – supported by P.A. eth-talk – that can
ignore the larger societal forces that may be involved in (“impacting on”
or “aided
by,” for
instance) public administration. Assume
that a McDonaldization Thesis is correct, for example; the thesis is “that the
fast-food restaurant, especially the pioneering and still dominant chain of
McDonald’s restaurants, is the contemporary paradigm of the rationalization
process” (Ritzer, 1998, p. vii). Assume
that the world is increasingly being McDonaldized (e.g., see Ritzer, 1993). Is a Public Administration – and its
supporting eth-talk – healthy if it can by-pass such developments that have
great significance for P.A. practice, especially the longer-term and more
fundamental aspects of macro P.A. practice.
On a consequential basis, some will ask how ethical is any such shortsighted
isolation from central long-term features of the practical world.
Should not P.A. eth-talk place
appropriate emphasis on analyzing deep structures, e.g., in understanding the
P.A. preference for the short-term and the micro? Consider the following example of the deep structure of American
common law, and then consider the case of P.A.’s short-term and micro
proclivity. The current character of
American common law has been described as the result of its having been shaped
by the elaboration of its “deep structure” in England between 1272 and 1547, a
deep structure relevant to justice issues in that part of this structure was
its inclination toward the advantage “of the wealthier gentry and its
professional cohort in the legal profession” (Cantor, 1997, p. 192). Cantor points to what he sees as examples of
deep structure in physics, Greek philosophy, Renaissance Italian art, and
modern medicine grounded in microbiology.
Would not understanding of P.A.’s short-term and micro proclivity be
deepened if it were assisted by eth-talk that recognized that a deep structure
of modern bureaucracy was its shaping as an adjunct of hierarchical royal
power? Modern bureaucracy was indeed
conceived in the service of the prince, and P.A. eth-talk should surely recognize
that the hierarchical inclination that conditions micro and macro
decision-making in today’s bureaucracy is the heir of this deep structure.
Consider the central claim of
this section from another perspective.
Does not the practical world present us with at least two opposing
world-views or grand societal perspectives that are involved in any
understanding of strategies for addressing macro bureaucratic issues –
bureaucracy “as a whole”? Are they not
involved in the eth-talk that should relate to a macro issue such as the “iron
cage” problem described by Max Weber?
Does not their existence of the competing world-outlooks underscore the
need to seek comprehensive practicality in approaching ethics?
One world outlook (outlook 1)
celebrates the economic efficiency of capitalism, and it is supported by
concepts and metaphors like the principles of self-interest and Adam Smith’s
invisible hand. This world outlook
encourages the adoption of consumerism as an ideal for public administration
practice; the overall motif is the efficiency ethic, an ethic where public
administration – operating in a command economy situation – cannot be
outstandingly successful. The role of
eth-talk in this context is no more than accidental and supportive. It is accidental in the sense that ethics is
not central for the furtherance of efficiency.
It is no more than supportive in securing the efficiency of the workers
who fit into the needs of the machinery of government.
In work outlook 1, the
practicality that is valued is that which maintains the current general
framework of the existing machinery of government, and the efficiency that is
sought is that obtainable within the existing context. The emphasis is tending the machinery of
government is on practicality in the sense of activities yielding short-run and
micro payoff. Within this outlook the
critical ethical question is how the worker and the work can be efficient. So there is an emphasis on ethical issues
that have great value for this “fitting in” of the worker and the “efficiency”
of the machine. Examples are ethical
dilemmas like blowing the whistle, conflict of loyalties and the other
day-to-day micro issues. Yes, change
toward more ethical micro behavior is being encouraged. But the changes sought are within the
existing basic framework. That is, the
choice of ethical issues favors retention of the status quo; it favors this
narrow understanding of the concept of practicality.
An alternative work outlook
(outlook 2) involves a focus on justice or caring, on the liberation of the
human spirit, and on a curbing of evil and harm – all of which ideas, for
convenience’s sake, we will understand for the time being under the term
“justice”. With a range of often-conflicting
prescriptions, one manifestation includes at least the aim of correcting the
market’s misallocation of “some” or “many” resources. In this outlook, public administration at a minimum is not
completely market-oriented. It seeks
efficiency only to the extent that efficiency furthers its values.
In world outlook 2, the primary
emphasis is on practicality in the sense of moving toward justice, as we have
just sketched the term. Practicality is
understood as encouraging more fundamental change in public administration and
in the larger societal systems and beyond, to the extent that such systems are
involved in moving toward justice. It
embraces not only the micro but also the macro, recognizing (among other
things) that the macro shapes justice considerations in the micro. This is in contrast to a focus, which is
essentially limited to the micro ethical dilemmas of fitting into the workplace
machine and the short-run ethical issues concerned with the functioning of the
governmental machine. In outlook 2, the
importance of individual micro choices is not denied. However, the focus also extends to include macro long-range
concerns of bureaucracy.
The class of macro ethical
issues would surely include, for example, those relating to difference and
marginalizing. This would include the
marginalizing of people, such as women, children, minorities, and so on. It would also include the marginalization of
perspectives and the role of institutional arrangements as marginalizers. In addition to the “iron cage” problem
mentioned above, it would include the ongoing antipathy against government
(Farmer, 1999a) , and aspects of globalization (the dialectic between
globalization and localization).
Such macro study cannot be
limited to governmental institutions. For instance, governments operate in a
civil society, including the world of corporations and other entities. The ethical aspects of such topics as
secrecy or corruption can hardly be studies as if government can be studied as
if government were not part of society (e.g., see Knapp Commission, 1973), any
more than the size of government can be studied in isolation. Arguably, such macro study goes very
wide. It begins with such starting
points as that human beings, despite all our aggressiveness, live in
groups. From this starting point,
Eibl-Eibesfelt (1996) goes on to pose the question of how we manage this. “By what means do we maintain and form bonds
with our fellow men, in spite of the ‘aggression barrier?’…How do sociability
and love develop both phylogenetically (in the course of evolution) and
ontogenetically (during the lifetime of the individual)? And how does hate
evolve (p. 5) Our discipline’s direction may differ from Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s, but our scope should not be artificially
narrowed.
Healthy eth-talk needs a greater
emphasis on issues of justice. This
emphasis could well be facilitated by recognizing a distinction between Micro
Public Administration Ethics and Macro Public Administration Ethics. Tipping the scales toward the latter in P.A.
eth-talk would be consistent with a more comprehensive sense of practicality
and greater functionality.
Healthy P.A. eth-talk should incorporate an
authentically hesitant posture toward imposing ethical prescription on
others. There should be a hesitant attitude
in alterity, the relationship to the moral other. Most P.A. eth-talk-and P.A. in general-has not been influenced by
this notion, which is relatively new to P.A. (e.g., Farmer, 1995). Before
examining the idea, we can notice its relevance to any multi-opinioned or
multi-cultural situation and we can note what St. Augustine’s attitude would
have been.
On general relevance to any
multi-opinioned situation where no ethical prescription can be determined
certainly by an appeal to reason, there is a range of options concerning my
attitude toward imposing “my” moral convictions on “you.” At one end, I could
do whatever it takes (for your “good”) to get you to accept my truth-including
even varieties of violence and deceit.
At the other extreme, I could do nothing-including not even giving you
my opinion. Even in a context where
intersubjective certainty is unavailable by an appeal to reason (unaided human
reason), nevertheless each person may develop sure opinions or convictions
(e.g., as did St. Augustine when he converted, falling to the ground in
Milan). The question is what is right
for me to do when another does not agree with me on a moral prescription that I
hold strongly. Should a militant
Christian (or socialist) impose her moral values on a militant atheist (or
conservative)?
St. Augustine would not have
sympathized with my claim asking the militant to hesitate, as we can suspect
form his attitude toward the persecution of heretics (e.g., Paolucci, 1962, pp.
184-240). In his Treatise on the Correction of the Donatists, Augustine writes
that “For many have found advantage (as we have proved, and are daily proving
by actual experience), in first being compelled by fear or pain, so that they
might afterwards be influenced by teaching, or might follow out in ac what they
had already learned in word?” (Paolucci, 1962, p. 214). Here I part company with St. Augustine.
This section concentrates on one
major feature (among the several) of alterity-hesitation. Our inherited-the traditional, Western modernist-attitude
in bureaucracy involves a privileging of assertiveness over hesitancy, a
valuing of taking charge and requiring the right thing. This privileging is reflected in such
features as over-valuation of hierarchy and the standard “impossible to
fulfill” incantation on job descriptions that the function of the supervisor is
to “direct, coordinate and control all the activities and personnel on the
assigned unit.” It is reflected in the context of bureaucracy-in our political,
legal and cultural practices, for example-in preference for debate and
confrontation rather than dialogue and shared exploratory discourse (e.g., see
Tannen, 1998). It is a privileging of
the predominant attitude of Occidental Christianity over Oriental Confucianism.
Authentic hesitation does not
entail inauthentic hesitation, which can be a matter of mere procrastination or
mere passivity-a putting off, or a suppressing, of what can be said and
done. An authentic version involves genuineness
in relating to others and to our epistemological situation. It does not refer to procrastination or
passivity about the wishes and ethical prescriptions of others, and it does not
endorse (for example) bureaucratic inaction or buck passing in response to the
wishes of others. Rather authentic
hesitation refers to the style of holding and expressing our own or our group’s
ethical prescriptions; it concerns hesitation only in the maintaining and
imposing of our own (or our group’s) opinions about the right thing to be done. (“Group” in this case includes such
associations as “my” employment, family, regional, class, religious, social,
national or other groups). Nor does
authentic hesitation involve denying one’s own beliefs or conclusions. Rather, the hesitation in making one’s own (or
our group’s) claims is, as it were, minimal; it asks the holder to exercise
some restraint in the holding and in the imposing. The notion of “hesitation” is subject to significant
misunderstanding, a “bad rap” often tied in with linguistic and proverbial
associations. Yet it is clear enough
that a world with some authentic hesitation is eminently desirable. The question really is-how much and about
what?
Justice as
authentic hesitation involves both personal and interpersonal openness. It
engages these two interrelated sorts of openness-on our part or on behalf of
our group-in such terms as cognition, emotion and will. These sorts of openness presuppose certain
habitual behaviors and awareness. For
example, personal openness presupposes a habit of critical and self-aware
thinking behavior and an awareness of the limits of our individual
epistemological situation.
Hesitation itself has been a
type of secondary theme in Western modernity, in the sense that neighboring
virtues have been valued in liberal and other political philosophies. Such virtues include toleration, mutual
respect, sympathy, public reason, and full consideration to the arguments of
others. The point is that hesitation is
not such an outlandish idea as it may at first appear.
Toleration was valued by John
Locke, for example, his religious toleration was a limited live and let live
attitude developed within the context of Locke’s other views that individuals
must observe certain constraints in pursuing their self identified interests. Mutual respect, demanding more than the live
and let live attitude of toleration, is a civic virtue that has an important
role in the thinking of Hobbes, Hegel, Mill and Rawls. Mutual respect was for Hegel required for
each to be fully human, for instance, and this is discussed in Hegel’s
dialectic of the master and the slave.
Adman Smith wrote of the propensity to sympathize with others. For him, economic life should be seen
against a larger background of natural sympathy. Mutual respect for Immanuel Kant was further developed in terms
of the notion of public reason, whereby individuals show mutual respect in
critical thinking that takes into account the views of others. Public reason as a concept was democratized
more fully by writers like Mill and Rawls than in Kant’s account. “Full consideration to the argument of
others” was advocated by John Stuart Mill.
Mill’s argument was that experience is not enough to guide life; rather,
“there must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted” (Mill,
1961, p. 205). Rawls adopted Kant’s
approach to public reason. He thinks
that public reasoning should take place within “a political conception of
justice based on the values that others can reasonably be expected to endorse”
(Rawls, 1993, p. 226). His guidelines
provide that there should be an open discussion of public issues. There must be a commitment to civility. Also, people should not use a particular
nonpublic religion or philosophical position as a basis for a basic justice
claim.
For an account of an count of an
application to Public Administration in terms of anti-administration, see
Farmer, 1995; 1998; 1999b.
The hesitant attitude toward
ethical prescription that has predominated in the Western tradition and that is
a leading feature of the modernist mind-set has achieved not only minuses
(e.g., mass destruction) but also many appreciable pluses (e.g., longer lives,
more consumer goods, great music). The
suggestion is that much more could be realized –augmenting the pluses and
diminishing the minuses-by incorporating the hesitant attitude in P.A.
eth-talk.
This article suggested that P.A. eth-talk (study
and discussion of Public Administration) can be dysfunctional, and it is
harmful to public administration practice and thinking-ethics properly being at
the heart of the p.a. discipline-not to identify the criteria that can
distinguish healthy from dysfunctional eth-talk. The article illustrated these
two claims by discussing three among the minimal criteria that healthy P.A.
eth-talk should meet. It did so by
repeating much that I have discussed earlier (e.g., in Farmer, 1995;
1999). The first criterion is that
healthy P.A. eth-talk should be realistic in its recognition of the
epistemological nature of the ethical, and that ethics that are unrealistic are
dysfunctional. Second, healthy eth-talk
should be comprehensively practical, avoiding a constricted view of
practicality. Third, healthy eth-talk
should incorporate a hesitant posture toward imposing ethical prescriptions on
others. A practical implication of this
article is that P.A. eth-talkers should think through the institutional need to
distinguish between healthy and dysfunctional eth-talk.
1. Much of this material and words in this article have been taken from my previous publications. For example, this article contains such material from an earlier paper, which became Farmer, 1999.
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