Labor-Management
Relations, Collective Bargaining, and the Public Sector: Collaborative Solutions in Alameda,
California
Edward J. Martin, Ph.D.
The Graduate Center for Public Policy and Administration
California State University, Long Beach
The future of public sector labor
unions and management is one of increased collaboration. In order to make government "work better
and cost less" (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; see also Schmidt and
Finnigan, 1992; E. Ostrom, 1986),
labor and management have sought to become more efficient in the utilization of
public funds and resources. In doing so,
democratic institutions in the United States have become revitalized through
public labor and management efforts to provide greater "customer
service" (Sulzer, 1997; Sulzer, 1985).
Background
In 1962 John F. Kennedy's Executive Order
10988 made collective bargaining a lawful practice in public sector
negotiations. For the first time, it
allowed federal employees to engage in union organizing and collective
bargaining. Later, this order was
expanded upon by Richard Nixon's Executive Orders 11491 (1969) and 11616
(1971), and Gerald Ford's Executive Order 11838 (1975), which formalized the
bargaining process for federal employees.
Finally, in 1978 under Jimmy Carter, the Civil Service Reform Act
stipulated that the president no longer had the authority to regulate the
collective bargaining process on his own behalf (Kearney, 1998; Martin,
1979; Brooks, 1971; Chamberlain, 1965).
As a result, clearly established procedures had been established for
regulating public sector collective bargaining (Robertson and Seneviratne,
1995).
However, during the past two decades
public sector labor and management have continually been at odds over issues
relating to compensation, benefits, overtime, etc. Mutually agreeable accommodations for both
parties have been difficult to achieve.
Cognizant of this problem, public labor unions and government agencies
have begun to implement Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs in order to help
mitigate negotiation issues (Prasnikar, 1991; Krim and Arthur, 1989). While highly successful in Western Europe,
QWL methods have been utilized in Japan and the United States. The important
tactic in QWL methods is to promote participative negotiations and
team-oriented approaches in problem-solving.
In utilizing QWL methods, public labor and management negotiations have
resulted in creating an atmosphere of collaboration and respect which has
helped in resolving disputes (Kearney and Hays, 1994; Hoerr, 1989; Krim, and
Arthur, 1989; Sirianni, 1987). QWL
methods have also extended to managerial levels, joint and ad hoc committees,
and advisory committees as a means to resolve issues at lower levels where
labor and management at times conflict over issues. To some degree, QWL methods reduce the need
for outside arbitration (Guzda, 1993; Tsiganou, 1991).
In the 1990s, advocates of improved
employer-employee relations discovered that participative decision making (PDM)
and employee involvement (EI) were also a viable options as methods for dispute
resolution. These methods were adopted
by the U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Involvement and Quality Improvement
Project (Armshaw, Carnevale, and Bruce, 1993). In this situation, cooperation between labor
and management through PDM and EI methods became significant factors in helping
to facilitate more amicable negotiations in collective bargaining. The implicit strategy of PDM in particular is
to reduce the "we-they" mindset that pervades negotiations. One such government entity to successfully
utilize PDM methods has been the City of Alameda, California.
The
City of Alameda
In 1995, the City of Alameda,
California and non-management union representation entered into negotiations on
a "meet and confer" basis.
This was based on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding a new
wage-and-benefit package. During a
three-year period of protracted and unsuccessful negotiations, an impasse had
finally been reached in which arbitration was needed between the fire
department's union representation and the City of Alameda. For over a year arbitration continued. During the four years that transpired,
labor-management relations deteriorated to the point of conflict and
antagonism. Invariably tensions mounted
between the two negotiating parties because of the lengthy process of the
negotiations, the high cost in resources and funds to negotiate, and the
acerbic work environment that resulted from the former unresolved issues
between labor and management (Flint, 2002).
It was not until June of 1997 that
leadership of both labor and management arranged for a number of informal
meetings as an external arbitration process.
The central issue for these meetings was to discuss the possibility for
constructing a partnership that might resolve the problems that exist between
labor and management. Their goal was to
resolve the wage-and-benefit dispute that had kept negotiations at
loggerheads. Though the discussions on
how to resolve these differences could not formally take place until
arbitration was finalized, both labor and management were eager to maintain
dialogue on searching for an agreed alternative to their collective bargaining
problems. As a continuation of these
informal dialogues, labor and management both agreed that they would conduct
their discussions by utilizing "interest-based negotiations" (IBN) as
a tool for attempting to repair their already damaged relationship. Consequently, the City of Alameda decided to
fund a number of training seminars in IBN methods.
Significant attempts had been made
to establish realistic expectations about which goals could be accomplished
given the available resources of time and money. Regardless of the objective expectations of
what might be achieved, labor and management attempted to make an asserted
effort to distribute the inherent risks in the reconstruction of
negotiations. The training was thus
completed and the task of identifying a solution commenced. Even though a final decision during this time
was made by an arbitrator, both parties concurred with respect to postponing
any action on the arbitrator's recommendations.
Both parties approved a remedy that was the outcome of another year of
IBN negotiation strategies. Consequently,
the differences between labor and management were mitigated as the result of
collective bargaining methods since the signing of the MOU three years prior. Thus the new labor-management relations
resulted in the following:
1. An extension of MOUs from three to eight
years.
2. Improved labor-management negotiations
using collaborative IBN methods.
3. Reduced grievances from multiple
complaints each year to none in the past three.
4. Savings in overtime expenses in excess of
one million dollars.
5. Continued union cooperation with the City
of Alameda in cost-saving measures related to fire service delivery.
6. Continued cooperation with union and
management in joint searches for new fire department recruits.
7. Continued cooperation with union
representation in assisting the City of Alameda with job descriptions for
captains and chiefs.
8. Union participation and selection in job
related interviews of all candidates.
As optimistic as this scenario
appears, disagreements still resulted from time-to-time between labor and
management (Flint, 2002).
Nevertheless, an infrastructure had been established in which labor and
management effectively resolved conflict and moved ahead in a collaborative
manner to provide public service. This
new template for labor management negotiations became the preeminent model for
conflict resolution within city departments in Alameda. In fact, James Flint, city manager of Alameda
has argued that "enmity in the workplace has been replaced with an open
environment of effective communication between labor and management. Accusations resulting from distrust of one
party by the other have given way to an atmosphere in which the benefit of the
doubt is genuinely given to each other when disagreements occur" (p.
21). While this example in
labor-management relations demonstrates one significant example of success, it
nevertheless stands as a model for practitioners.
Changing Public Sector
Negotiations
Because it is difficult
to limit the scope of
bargaining, the human resources dimension is significantly affected by the
bargaining process. Virtually all
elements of the employment situation -- which involves personnel and human
resources -- can be negotiated precisely because many states permit bargaining
on all aspects (Bachrach and Lawler, 1981). This may very well mean that seniority and
the merit system, and the numerous regulations associated with this policy,
will be reevaluated in some way.
Consequently, change in the collective bargaining process is a reality
that will be addressed in some capacity (Cayer, 1996; Reeves, 1997).
The collective-bargaining process
can be successful if both management and unions see themselves in a team effort
and not in a zero-sum contest. This
realization has come about through a shared understanding by labor and
management that flexibility and cooperation are advantageous for labor,
management, and the public at large (Cozzetto and Pediliski, 1999). By focusing on those areas of needed
improvement and negotiating accordingly, management and labor can proceed in a
relatively cooperative manner to promote a win-win situation for all parties
involved. This is especially relevant
given the current local, state, and government crises with budgets and finance
(Flint, 2002; Kettl, 1997).
Opponents of union activity claim
that unions in general only add to the divisive climate within public agencies,
thus making it more difficult for managers to administer in a productive and
efficient manner. Anti-union propaganda
generally focuses on how unions sow discord among workers thus making it
increasingly difficult to manage in a climate of labor hostility. Administrators argue that it is cumbersome to
manage through quasi-legal mechanisms instead of utilizing less formal (and
implicitly more effective) methods such as dialogue and discussion. Thus the question of organizational
effectiveness is one that plagues union activity. This is especially the case now that capital
has become increasingly global. (DiNome, Yaklin, and Rosenbloom, 1999).
The proponents of public labor
unions, on the other hand, argue that union solidarity is relevant precisely
because organized labor offers support to workers who might otherwise be
undermined by management (Parsons, Belcher, and Jackson, 1998; Fisher and
Ury, 1981). Labor leaders argue that
unions provide greater productivity as a result of organizing efforts. In fact, the evidence of improved public
sector labor-management cooperation has resulted in improved communication
between labor and management, expediting and reducing grievances, and a
"positive impact on morale reflected in less absenteeism and turnover and
increased productivity" (The Bureau of National Affairs, 1992: 2). According to N. Joseph Cayer, this process
can produce decisions that tend to mirror a "general perspective rather
than the particular concerns of the moment or situation. In other words, it helps establish a general
policy within which decisions can be made" (Cayer, 1996: 162).
During the 1990s, pressure from numerous
sources was placed on government to consider "privatizing" its
functions (Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman, 1995; Bendor, 1990). This was intended to make government more
cost-effective, yet in many situations to translated into downsizing and
lay-offs (Nee, Kennedy, and Langham, 1999; Walters, 1994). Aware of this trend, public labor has been
willing to find cooperative solutions rather than face gridlock and job
losses. What has developed, according to
Cayer, is a "new cooperative approach which permits labor to have some say
in how plans are implemented and helps protect some of the interests of
unionized employees" (Cayer, 1996: 162-163). Thus a new form of cooperative labor and
public management has developed at various levels of government and in several
states such as California, Illinois, Ohio, and New Jersey (Reshef, Kizilos,
Ledford, and Cohen, 1999; Fretz and Walsh, 1998; Walters, 1994). In other locations, such as Vermont and
Pennsylvania, the rigid positions held by both labor and management have tended
to promote losses for stakeholders in both public labor and management.
Other creative efforts to bridge the
gap between public labor and government is evidenced with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). The IRS has developed,
according to Cayer, a partnership council which "oversees initiatives such
as the attendance of union representatives at meetings of directors and
division staff and meetings on budgets, joint instructorship at training
sessions for all employees, and creation of conflict resolution council to
attempt to resolve complaints about unfair labor practices in an informal
process" (Cayer, 1996: 163).
Consequently, this inclusion of previously divergent interests has
established an atmosphere of mutual respect between public labor unions and
public management. As a result, public
labor unions are less willing to support union members, even with seniority
under the civil service merit system, who are unwilling to cooperate in
professional development. On the other
hand, organized labor has also been more willing to send its leadership to
Total Quality Management (TQM) training seminars as required by management of
public employees (Cozzetto and Pedelinski, 1999; Brock, 1998; Milinski,
1998; Fretz and Walsh, 1998; Kearney, 1992).
Linking Theory and
Practice
The theoretical foundations for this new partnership between
public labor unions and government can be noted in the writings of B. Guy
Peters. In order to make government more
responsive to both public labor unions and management, Peters argues for a more
"flexible government" model.
In the past, working at a government agency brought with it the common
perception that employment was virtually guaranteed for life. People comprising these organizations tended
to focus more exclusively on maintaining the well-being of the institution and
longevity of individual careers more than the mission of the agency
itself. In fact, government agencies
have tended to view themselves as permanent entities. This fixation on survival, according to
Peters, tends to ossify institutional effectiveness regarding policy and
planning.
This perception of permanence,
argues Peters, brought with it a certain level of dysfunction. "Permanence," argues Peters,
"has come to be considered as the source of excessive conservatism of
policies and as the source of commitments to an organization more than to the
policies being administered by the organization" (Peters, 1996: 30). Thus Peters argues, if an organization,
whether management and/or labor, is focused on simply trying to survive, then
the mission of civil service -- essentially a commitment to the common good --
is being jeopardized. What peters argues
for, in the flexible government approach, is an alternative structural
arrangement that provides for a type of middle ground between those who argue
for the status quo of "big government" and scholars such as Niskanen
and Tullock who argue that permanence and bureaucratic monopolies create
excessive costs and policy rigidities (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965). Peters Argues that the flexible government
approach "stresses the ability of managers to adjust their workforce
requirements to match demands . . . this can be used as a means of saving a
good deal of money for government, as well as mitigating some of the public
perceptions of waste and empire-building by government organizations" (Peters,
1996: 32).
Another theoretical model for this
new relationship between public labor unions and government can be analyzed in
terms of H. Brinton Milward's "hollow state" model. This model-metaphor was constructed by
Milward as a result of the public sector trends in contracting with profit and
nonprofit organizations for taxpayer funded services (Milward, 1996). For Milward, the hollow state signifies a
separation between a governing body and the services it provides. The hollow state relies on private
organizations, non governmental organizations (NGOs), and non profits to
deliver services on a contractual basis.
As a matter of policy and planning, the hollow state contracts out
services to third parties while retaining an agency function responsible for
"negotiating, monitoring, and evaluating contracts" (Milward,
1996: 194). While the obvious
administrative distance between these two extremes presents problems of
accountability, the basic function of the hollow state remains constant in
"arranging networks, whereas the traditional task of government is to
manage hierarchies" (Milward, 1996: 194). Consequently, government is relieved from the
burdensome duty of providing multiple services.
The hollow state thus empowers governments, in the words of Milward, to
"steer rather than row" (Milward, 1994: 73).
The flexible government and hollow
state models can best be understood by recognizing that these two approaches
offer alternative structural arrangements for government to operate. They allow for more flexibility with respect
to how public sector collective bargaining is conducted. In fact, it has resulted in more flexible
negotiations in which public labor unions have more decision-making power, not
only in labor negotiations, but also in policy formulation. On the other hand, unions have been more
flexible in agreeing to concessions made by public managers (Cozzetto and
Pedeliski, 1999; Beil and Litscher, 1998; Brainerd, 1998). Thus Peters and Milward's models facilitate a
cooperative spirit in labor-management relations and governing capacity in
general (Carnevale, 2003; Fretz and Walsh, 1998).
Implications of the
Alameda Case
In the case of Alameda, labor and management eventually came
to realize that they needed to work more carefully with each other in order to
avoid future conflicts. The continued
efforts on behalf of each party to maintain open dialogue became a priority for
labor relations and management. Thus the
implications of this example of labor-management relations resulted in positive
outcomes for labor, management, and the City of Alameda. Consequently, the City of Alameda established
the following priorities in their labor-management relations:
1. An attempt to prevent relationships from
deteriorating.
2. Proactive leadership in building trust
and mending fences to minimize or eliminate conflict.
3. Train employees through labor-management
teams in problem-solving and conflict-resolution skills.
4. Promote risk-management strategies that
actually share decision-making power with labor.
5. Seek consensus from all relevant parties.
6. Joint accountability in arriving at
collaborative solutions.
As a number of case studies have
shown, collaborative efforts between labor and management in collective
bargaining promotes a more congenial relationship between public labor unions
and government (Beers, 2000; Blank, 1999; Leigh and Gifford, 1999, Perline,
1999; Levine, 1997). These studies have
revealed that when workers have a voice in their working conditions, then a
more cohesive, effective, and productive working situation results. "Because employees participate in the
decision-making process, according to Cayer, "they are likely to be more
committed to the organization than is the case when management unilaterally
dictates policy. In fact, management
often has an ally in the employee representative in getting its policies
across. Employees are much more
receptive to decisions that are explained by one of their own" (Cayer,
1996: 162).
Thomas Barth argues that a more
collaborative and democratic environment in public sector labor management
negotiations promotes a more efficient and effective public workforce. Barth argues that public administration
should continue to focus on "developing the capacity of managers to act as
coaches and facilitators rather than as supervisors and controllers" (Barth,
1996: 183). This same philosophy has
spread to the state level where public labor unions in Illinois, Ohio, New
Jersey, Arizona, and Wisconsin have adapted collaborative labor-management
relations and experienced significant improvements in the overall facilitation
of negotiations with public labor unions (Aronowitz, 1998; Peightal, Souza,
Bray, Roque, Pritchard, and Thomas, 1998; Lyons and Vivenzio, 1998).
Conclusion
Collective bargaining in the public sector can be understood
as a tool by which public agency managers and public union representation
negotiate terms and conditions of employment (Hickman and Lee, 2001; Kochan and Katz, 1988). Negotiations serve as an alternative
personnel system based upon the perceived value of employee rights negotiated
through a collective voice. This
constitutes a sanction function, precisely because collective bargaining
conditions and terms, determine and maintain the employment relationship
between employees and the employer (Cayer, 1996; 1989). As a result of collaborative efforts between
labor and management in the City of Alameda, labor and management appear to
optimizing their relationship by promoting a win-win situation for both
parties.
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Edward
J. Martin, Ph.D. is a professor of public policy and administration at
California State University, Long Beach.
His research interest include public policy, public administration,
political economy, and urban affairs.
California
State University, Long Beach
The
Graduate Center for Public Policy and Administration
1250
Bellflower Blvd.
Long
Beach, CA 90840
562-985-5748
emarti11@csulb.edu