Democratization: The Development of Nongovernmental
Organizations (NGOs) in Central and Eastern Europe
Ginta T. Palubinskas
The School of Public Policy
George Mason University
Abstract
This
paper examines the impacts of public policy on organizational behavior in
relationship to the process of democratization and the development of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in post-communist Central and Eastern
European countries. The public policies
and public management style in these countries under communist rule differed
greatly from those associated with democratic societies. Under communism, public policies were geared
toward making the individual totally dependent on the state. These policies must now be replaced with
policies that support democratic values.
This study finds, that the democratization of post-communist Central and
Eastern European countries can best be achieved through the development of a
political climate conducive to private initiative and to the growth and
development of NGOs.
Central
and Eastern Europe Under Soviet Domination:
The implementation of soviet communism in
Central and Eastern Europe[1]
resulted in the transformation of the existing political, economic and social
structures of the region, including the virtual elimination of all
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Under the new soviet regimes, all political, economic and social
activities were controlled by a totalitarian state dominated by a single party. The communists sought to establish a new
social order in which private property and competition were abolished, money
and credit were centralized in the hands of the state, and all children were
educated by the state (Marx and Engels 1964).
In establishing this new social order, the soviets radically changed the
existing social capital of the Central and Eastern European countries. The soviet system changed the informal norms
within Central and Eastern European societies by replacing them with formal
norms – new rules and laws decreed by the state without popular participation
and consent. Sovietization[2]
was forced on largely unwilling populations through the restriction of
political debate and the expansion of the soviet security apparatus. The soviet system, which bound the
soviet-dominated nations of Central and Eastern Europe and guided their
political, economic and social development during the course of more than
seventy years, was instituted by the soviets using an extraordinarily brutal
paradigm of an onslaught of mass terror, succeeded by generalized terror and
subsequently held in place through selective repression (Palubinskas
2002).
Selective Repression Coercion
and Threats Generalized
Terror Intimidation Isolation Degradation Emotional
Abuse Economic Abuse
Figure 1: Sovietization Paradigm (Palubinskas 2002)
Excessive force and mass terror were used to eliminate
anyone who “displayed an independent mind about public affairs” (Service 1997,
p. 225) and it was used to establish soviet control in all of the countries
that came under soviet domination. Generalized terror was used to further
eliminate anyone capable of challenging the soviet regime, to dissolve existing
social relationships and to completely subordinate the individual to the state.
The soviet state aim was to break
society down into a collection of individuals (Moore 1954), which acted
“collectively only when mobilized by party and government” (Service 1997, p.
245). It sought to control every unit of
social life, consciously seeking even the disintegration of family loyalty
(Conquest 1990); the soviet state was to supersede all else, and the individual
was to become an accessory of the state.
The soviet state targeted all of
those viewed as potential opponents of the soviet system – former government
officials, former army officers, soldiers, former members of the judiciary,
former police officers, former political party members, active members of
student organizations, landlords, merchants, bankers, businessmen, wealthier
farmers, anyone who had fought against the soviets, and anyone resisting
collectivization, industrial-ization, and secularization of society – as well
as their families, colleagues, friends and neighbors.
Constant fear of repression, the
soviet demand for “not only submission, but also complicity” (Conquest 1990, p.
252), and progressive soviet subversion of previously existing social ties,
spurred an increasing sense of isolation among the soviet dominated peoples and
succeeded in obliterating a general sense of trust within the soviet-conquered
societies.
Once the general population of a
country had been terrified into submission and was too fearful to oppose the
soviet regime, selective repression was used to maintain that fear. Anyone willing to overtly challenge the
soviet regime was condemned. Dissent was punished. Privacy disappeared as the state encouraged
people to monitor and report on their neighbors, friends, and even family
members. Consequently, trust eroded; conversations became guarded; and,
associations faded. As the soviet state
strove to increasingly control both the public and private spheres of life, the
soviet dominated peoples learned to avoid even the appearance of having
independent opinions (Service 1997), to fear showing initiative (Smith 1976),
and to live with a “deeply ingrained sense of impotence, because of the
official power of retaliation, and the assertive intrusion of officialdom with
personal lives” (Smith 1976, p. 259).
The sovietization process was, in
many ways, analogous to battering (Palubinskas 2002). Batterers seek control of their victims
through the exertion of excessive force, or an unusual amount of control over
their victim’s activities, finances, contacts with others (Kosof 1995; Statman
1995). Usually, there is a determining
event that convinces the victim that the batterer can cause them tremendous harm,
and the fear that it generates forms the foundation of the batterer’s control
over his victim (Kosof 1995). Once a
victim believes that they are in imminent danger from the batterer, the victim
lives in constant fear of incurring the batterer’s wrath, of enduring another
violent episode, and strives to protect themselves and their family by learning
to censure their speech and actions in accordance to the batterer’s demands
(Johann 1994; Kosof 1995; Statman 1995).
The batterer’s control over the victim is maintained through explicit or
implicit threats of harm (Johann 1994; Kosof 1995). This battering paradigm is shown by the Power
and Control Wheel presented below.
Economic Abuse Controlling all resources and employment
opportunities Violence and Intimidation Using
violence to induce fear
Figure 2: Power and Control Wheel
(Based on
the Power and Control Wheel in Kosof 1995, p. 55)
A comparison of figures 1 and 2 shows
that the sovietization paradigm is consistent with the Power and Control Wheel
of battering: mass terror employs
violence and intimidation; generalized terror applies emotional abuse, economic
abuse and isolation; selective repression relies on coercion and threats.
Generalized Terror Intimidation Isolation Degradation Emotional Abuse Economic
Abuse
Figure 3: Comparison of Sovietization and Battering
Paradigms
The effect of sovietization is also
analogous to battering; in both cases, targets are subjected to prolonged
victimage,[3]
and exhibit signs of post traumatic stress – fear, helplessness, horror. Both paradigms create an imbalance of power
in which the target is made dependent on the dominant entity for survival. In both cases, the target is made to feel
powerless. Fear, despair, distrust, a
sense of isolation and depression characterized early soviet society to the
point that even the closest of personal relationships were subordinated to
obedience to the state; battered victims live in fear, isolation and
depression. Soviet terror pushed Central
and Eastern European populations into a state of depression and apathy;
battered victims live with a sense of helplessness and defeat. Just as the batterer seeks to control his
victim through complete dominance, so did sovietization implement
totalitarianism in which “the state breaks down the barrier between public and
private spheres to control not only the outward flow of social life, but the
inner lives of individuals” (Feffer 1992, p. 221).
The imbalance of power established
through the soviet policy of terror was institutionalized politically,
economically and socially, giving way to the development of a
“suspicion-ridden, corrupt, and exploited new society . . . living in a state
of fear and frustration” (Borsody 1993, p. 203). It had an important impact on how societies
under soviet rule were structured politically, economically and socially; on
how their social capital developed, and on the type of human capital (skills,
etc.) that was fostered.
The soviet state created and
controlled all social organizations, using them to indoctrinate, monitor and
control the soviet-dominated populations.
Unlike any natural community, soviet society was an “artificial social
unit” (Etzioni 1964, p. 58) – planned, deliberately structured and constantly
monitored. Due to its artificial nature,
the structure of soviet society was quite complex. Each of its subsystems was developed as a
virtual replica of the central system (Carrere D’Encausse 1982) and each of its
members subject to a distinct hierarchy of authority. The soviet social structure was constructed
so that each social unit, down to the individual, was effectively an auxiliary
of the state, controlled by the center through edicts enforced by the secret
police. Thus, soviet society was
structured as a formal organization and its culture was formed, transmitted and
enforced through formal mechanisms.
The soviet system was a
self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating system in which political, economic and
social policies were closely intertwined and used to promote subservience,
compliance, conformity, uniformity, and passiveness in soviet-dominated
populations. The soviet political system
shaped and controlled the economy and society.
All soviet-based societies were state-funded and state-organized. The government assigned jobs, paid salaries,
determined production quotas, issued payments for production resources,
allotted apartments, cars, systemized education, social clubs and health
care. The individual was made completely
dependent on the soviet state for survival.
Over time, people born into the
soviet system had little or no knowledge of alternative political, economic or
social structures. Their perception of
how government, the economy and society function was formed by the soviet
system itself. Daily existence taught
them how to function within a system that fostered uniformity, conformity,
subservience, passiveness, and discouraged individual initiative. Isolated from the rest of the world, people
living under soviet domination were
“expected
to join what Havel’s friend Ivan Klima called the ‘community of the defeated,’
and to abide by its basic rules: that
there would only ever be one governing party, to which everything, including
truth itself, belonged; that the world was divided into enemies and friends of
the Party, and accordingly, that compliance with the Party policies was
rewarded, dissent penalized; and, finally, that the Party no longer required
the complete devotion of its subjects, only the quiet acceptance of its
dictates” (Keane 2000, pgs. 232-233).
For nearly five decades, the people
of Central and Eastern Europe lived in command societies in which most social,
political and economic decisions were made for them, and individual initiative
was discouraged. Their societies were
dominated by a single party which controlled all resources and employment
opportunities, controlled social interaction, controlled the availability of
information, controlled freedom of movement, and used its economic power to
promote “correct attitudes among the masses, by inducing conformity of thought
and action” (Conquest 1968, p. 140).
They managed their affairs within a narrow scope of approved activity,
with no freedom of association, and no real possibility of forming
nongovernmental organizations.
Democratization and the
Development of Nongovernmetal Organizations (NGOs) in Post-Communist Central
and Eastern Europe
The collapse of communism in Central
and Eastern Europe released the fifty-year soviet grip on the region and the
process of transforming the countries into democracies with market-dominated
economic systems began. New
constitutions replaced those implemented during soviet rule in the region,
creating legal frameworks for the development of democratic societies. Laws and institutional structures were
changed, and soon the basic hallmarks of democratic societies – the right of
association, freedom of assembly, numerous political parties, free elections,
the rule of law, and peaceful transfers of power – were acknowledged and
evident in the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries.
Changes in laws and institutions
eliminated some of the former structures and relationships that existed in the
soviet system - multi-party systems replaced the single-party soviet political
system and people regained the right of association, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of movement - but in and of themselves, these changes did not transform
the post-soviet Central and Eastern European countries into democracies. Many of the countries experienced partial
democratization; formal democratic procedures and institutions have been
introduced, but everyday practice lacks the democratic spirit.
By 1997, it was clear that “economic
and democratic reform were complementary and heavily correlated,” when the
Freedom House Nations in Transit 1997 rankings showed that the Central and
Eastern European countries that were guided by the rule of law and were successfully
consolidating their market economies, were also making progress in their
transitions to democracy (Shor 1997, p. 2).
Less clear was that the transition from an authoritarian system of rule
to a democratic system also depends on the emergence of a strong
nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector.
NGOs serve three vital roles in democracies: they convey public opinion to lawmakers
formulating public policy; they advise the public of public policies and serve
as an instrument of policy implementation; and finally, they independently fund
and deliver services (Reeder 1999). In
post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, the emergence of NGOs marked a shift
from the previously existing balance of power in which the State was the
dominating entity upon which citizens depended for survival, to one more
conducive to a partnership between citizens and State; a shift away from
totalitarianism toward a democratic form of governance.
Interestingly, despite the abundance
of NGOs in the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries (Reeder
1999), the effectiveness of the NGO sectors in post-communist Central and
Eastern Europe remained underdeveloped.
This was due in part to the legislation passed with regard to the third
sector, and in part due to the expectations of the NGOs themselves; in pushing
for government funding, the NGOs remained closely tied to the government,
rather than forming a truly independent sector.
Many Central and East European governments tried to develop an adequate
legal and institutional framework for the NGO sector (Romania, Poland, Hungary,
Lithuania), but initially there seemed to be an undue emphasis in forming
NGO/Government partnerships, in which NGOs were funded from the state budget
(International Center for Not-For Profit Law, undated) and operated with a high
degree of government oversight.
In light of the previous
soviet-imposed system, this is not surprising.
In the soviet system, state funds had been used to underwrite every
official aspect of society, and to eradicate all that which was not
state-sanctioned. The soviet system had
discouraged innovation, experimentation, as well as independence of action and
thought, and had fostered subservience, compliance, passiveness, uniformity and
conformity. While the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe disturbed
the existing status quo, the soviet culture of dominance and dependence did not
disappear with the soviet system. As
would be expected, those in power continued to hold on to it, protecting the
rights and privileges that the soviet system had provided them. Those used to being dependent on the
government continued to cling to it for support. And finally, by attaching NGOs to the
government, each side took out a form of insurance – the government effectively
maintained control, while the new NGOs gained a sense of security, because they
were clearly government-sanctioned. This
interdependence slowed the development of civil society and democracy in
post-soviet societies.
As the NGO sectors continued to evolve in
the post-communist countries, their very existence contributed to the process
of democratization. Those post-communist
countries that have encouraged the growth of the NGO sector (Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Hungary) over the past decade have made tremendous progress toward
becoming democratic societies in a relatively short span of time. Those countries in the post-communist region
that have actively quashed their NGO sector through legislation (e.g.,
Belarus), have progressed little along the path to becoming democratic
societies.
The World Democracy Audit shows that
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia rank
among the 34 countries that are listed as “unquestionably free,” while Bulgaria
and Romania are classed as “free but with a distance to go” (based on Lindley
2002 and World Audit 2002).
Democratization has not progressed as far in the countries of the
Confederation of Independent States (CIS).
Russia ranks far below the post-communist Central and Eastern European
countries, at 101 on the list of countries audited, but ranks ahead of seven
other former soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). Moldova is the only one of the CIS countries
that ranks among the “free, but with a distance to go” countries.
Strengthening the NGO
Sector in Central and Eastern Europe
Developing adequate legal and
institutional frameworks for their NGO sectors is an important step in
developing a climate conducive to private initiative and the growth and
development of the third sector in post-communist Central and Eastern European
countries. Equally important is the
development of public policies specifically geared toward undoing the soviet
legacy of subservience, compliance, passiveness, uniformity and conformity, and
the development of policies that return power to the people, creating a solid
partnership between citizens and State.
Koestenbaum (1991) provides a simple formula for empowerment:
Empowerment (E) is the
product of autonomy (A), direction (D), and support (S), or
E = A x D x S
To promote autonomy, the Central and Eastern European governments should focus
on projects that come from the initiatives of their citizens, rather than trying
to create NGOs that fulfill government initiatives. In terms of direction, more than anything else, governments should pave the way
for philanthropy by creating tax incentives (i.e. income tax deductions) for
individuals and enterprises to support NGOs financially. Income tax deductions for charitable giving
would make plain that the government respects individual choice, and encourages
philanthropy. They would also serve to
decentralize the current system in place in several countries (e.g., Hungary)
where the government allows individuals to designate one percent of their
personal income tax to the civil sector (only to NGOs that meet the
government’s beneficiary criteria) and an additional one percent to churches,
which the government then distributes. Note the difference between this
practice, and those of old democracies, such as the United States, where funds
are given directly by the donor to his or her NGO of choice and a tax deduction
subsequently taken. Finally, government
should support the third sector by
providing tax relief to NGOs, particularly public benefit organizations.
Conclusion
Public policy continues to impact
organizational behavior in Central and Eastern Europe, because as the state
sector shrinks in Central and Eastern Europe, room for NGOs expands. By taking
themselves out of the third sector, Central and Eastern European governments
will create a political climate more conducive to private initiative and to the
growth and development of NGOs. NGOs
will form a true third sector – a sector active between the state sphere and
the market sphere – and increasingly involve citizens in democracy through
active participation. NGOs will also be free to convey public opinion to
lawmakers formulating public policy; advise the public of public policies and
serve as instruments of policy implementation; and, independently fund and
deliver services. This, in turn, will
increase democracy in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.
…
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