Abstract

This essay reviews William Browne's (1995) recent work, Cultivating Congress. Constituents, Issues, and Interests in Agricultural Policymaking. In this book, Browne analyzes the role of interest politics within the agricultural policy domain. Drawing his commentary from interview data, demographic data, history, and the scholarly insights of others, Browne examines how legislators assimilate district interests with their own – in other words, how they cultivate Congress in the pursuit of policymaking. The result is a first-rate account of how agriculture policy is made today and how it has evolved over time.

Book Review Essay

Overview and Critique.

Cultivating Congress. Constituents, Issues, and Interests in Agricultural Policymaking is an incisive, creative, thought-provoking work about growing good policy. In this book, Browne probes how legislators react to constituents "who cultivate Congress" – to wit, how legislators assimilate district interests with their own in the pursuit of policymaking.

Set against a backdrop of agricultural policymaking, Browne analyzes the role of interest politics. He draws his commentary from interview data, demographic data, history, and the scholarly insights of others. Browne carefully blends these ingredients and delivers a first-rate account of how agriculture policy is made today and how it has evolved over time. In the process, he also provides the reader with an excellent overview of the roles that legislators, committees, interest groups, bureaucrats and constituents play in cultivating policy.

Browne adds a handful of new or improved metaphors to a body of knowledge already rich with such similitudes of reality – specifically, member enterprises, home-style work, and policy games and players, just to name a few. Each new portraiture adds fresh insight and clarity, and therefore is a major contribution to the literature.

The member enterprises metaphor depicts Congress as an agglomerate of "small businesses," each in competition with one another to become proponents and advocates of particular public policies – especially vying for those most likely to keep the home-folks happy. Browne (1995:8-10) suggests that the best entrepreneurs are those who seize the opportunities provided by postreform rules to work their attentive publics and maintain popularity.

Home-style work refers to the efforts of congressional enterprises to cater to home district or state, in order to promote a favorable image with local constituents. Members of Congress perform their work under "uncertain circumstances," which stem from an interplay of forces at home and on Capitol Hill. In effect, members need to juggle a melee of competing demands and expectations (district constituents, committee chairs, subcommittee members, interest groups, public agencies, etc.) and hope that they attend the issues with the most personal pay-off. Browne (1995:4) submits that members of Congress resolve their uncertainties by "seeking safety in the home district" – or, as one policymaker is reported to have said, "In case of disagreement, choose your local voter."

Policy games are ongoing contests over well defined, commonly understood issues by rival policy players (Browne, 1995:xx). Policy players are those who play in the game: Political actors capable of rational thought; whose interests are served by influencing public policy; and who take an active role in the policy process (Browne, 1995:xxi). Strategy is a principal concept of the policy game. The game strategies of one player affect the game strategies of all others and vice versa. Policy games exist only when interests are apparent and understood to be key to the continued allocation of the domain's public policy benefits (Browne, 1995:xx).

Certainly, the notion of policymaking as a game is not new. (1) What Browne has done is to enlarge the concept. Typically game theory is a speculation tool used to highlight and analyze policy choices in a conflict situation. It is a deductive model of policymaking that describes how people would go about making decisions in competitive situations given they are completely rational, rather than how they actually make decisions (Dye, 1987:38). Thus, the outcomes are speculative because game theory conditions are seldom approximated in real life. Customary game scenarios include decisions about war and peace, the use of nuclear weapons, and other abstractions that are not readily testable. When applied to the agriculture policy domain as Browne has done in this book, the result is a fairly accurate portrayal of "what goes on" within the policy area. Since political conflict is more the rule than the exception within a policy domain, this marriage of metaphors constitutes a good fit where other rival explanations of agricultural policymaking, such as "iron triangles" and policy issue networks, fall short. In other words, the real utility of Browne's rendering of the metaphor is its capacity to highlight the interdependencies between each competitor's behaviors and to factor political conflict into the equation. Browne (1995:34) notes:

The domain becomes the well-recognized umbrella under which members of Congress and other players network and engage in individually rewarding behavior. In those terms a policy domain is, by nature, an untidy and cluttered political arena, far more subject to legitimate interference than is any version of a policy network or an establishment.

As a final comment on games and players, Browne's application in Cultivating Congress reminds us of the uncertain nature of American politics (games) and their pluralistic underpinnings. In the words of Yogi Berra, "It's not over till it's over." Quintessentially, a player's success is not understood until the final score (vote) is tallied. That one group's gain is another group's loss is the polestar of American democracy and is demonstrated clearly at the polls. Although Browne (1995:126-128) doesn't agree totally with the primacy of reelection, it is an unavoidable element.

Several provocative themes resonate throughout Browne's entire book – most notably: Congress is not the same anymore since postreform; iron triangles and all its aliases oversimplify the complexities of policymaking; the notion of policy domains; the increased individualism that characterizes modern Congress; and member uncertainty. Each argument is discussed in turn below.

Postreform Congress.

With this work, Browne (1995:xii) purports to "fill a theoretical and empirical void in the literature" concerning the relationship between policy networks and postreform Congress. Congress has re­invented itself. The procedural reforms of the 1970s have weakened committee autonomy, empowered individual members, transferred policy control to subcommittees, and strengthened party leadership (Browne, 1995:xxi, 3-21). As a result, congressional influence today is more "widely shared" (Browne, 1995:xxi).

According to Browne, traditional models fail to consider the structural changes of a new and improved Congress and therefore fail to explain how policy is really made in the brave new world of postreform. Browne proposes to correct these shortcomings and at the same time add to the body of knowledge about policy networks by recasting them instead as policy domains.

Iron Triangles.

Government has often been described as being heavily populated with iron triangles (Anderson, 1984:70) – subgovernments of mutually-dependent, autonomous decisionmakers, who promote policies in their own self-interest (Browne, 1995; Johnson, 1992:5; Kingdon, 1984:36; Ripley and Franklin, 1991). Principally in the area of distributive policy, and especially the agricultural policy domain, subgovernment proponents argue that these structures are a dominant force, impervious from the interference or control of outsiders (Anderson, 1984; Browne, 1995; Kingdon, 1984; Meier, 1993; Ripley and Franklin, 1991).(2)

The subgovernment interpretation of policymaking emphasizes a narrow set of participants, namely, bureaucrats, lobbyists, and legislators with jurisdiction for a selected policy area. According to the concept, the operations of a subgovernment are closed, cooperative and unobtrusive. Members operate largely unchecked within their own spheres of influence and make routine decisions (3) in selected, well-defined policy areas (Browne, 1980:64; Ripley and Franklin, 1991). Conflict is avoided because it would allow outsiders to intervene in policy affairs and alter the distribution of benefits (Johnson, 1992). Iron triangle proponents maintain that these are an important conduit for nongovernmental players to have input and sway in policy and program formation (Ripley and Franklin, 1991). (4) Although considerable attention has been devoted in search of iron triangles over the years (Anderson, 1984), empirical evidence generally fails to support the existence of these entities except in "the most isolated instances" (Browne, 1995:13). (5)

Browne challenges the long-held conventional view that agricultural policy is dominated by iron triangles (or any other shapes for that matter.) (6) Browne bases his challenge on the results of a three-year study in which he examined congressional involvement during the process of agricultural policymaking. (7) He concludes that the iron triangle metaphor oversimplifies the inherent complexities of politics and leads to an inaccurate understanding of the way in which the modernized Congress operates. In fact, Browne found that the highly recognized strong hold of bureaucrats and interests have given way to a new force – that of legislative staff experts and district influences (i.e., constituents).

Many authors have commented before Browne on the inadequacies of the iron triangle metaphor (Heclo, 1978; Johnson, 1992; Thurber, 1991). Two reasons commonly enumerated include: Conflict is inevitable and the triangle concept relies too heavily on the stability of relationships in the tripartite coalition; and the closed nature assumed to be present in the subgovernment ignores or discounts the influence of environmental factors such as the media (Browne, 1995:3-22; Heclo, 1978; Johnson, 1992; Thurber, 1991).

A competing theory of policy making that has emerged in response to the disillusionment with the iron triangle is that of the issue network. Issue networks are clusters of interdependent political actors (e.g., Congress, administration, organized interests, etc.) who interact in an open and flexible system to exchange information, influence public policy and attain mutual goals (Berry, 1989; Browne, 1995; Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Mandell, 1988). Issue networks are characterized by their permeable boundaries (Berry, 1989; Browne, 1995; Heclo, 1978; Johnson, 1992) and are commonly lauded for the vector they provide to policy participants to exchange information and influence policy decisions (Johnson, 1992). Yet even this metaphor is inadequate, according to Browne, because it does not sufficiently account for outside political interference and is too dependent upon a single set of policy actors routinely meeting to influence policy (Browne, 1995:xx; 32-33).

Policy Domains.

The notion of policy domains is the raison d'être for Browne's book and therefore, the most consequential of his arguments. Browne employs this concept to build a framework upon which to study how well members of Congress respond to their districts in agricultural policymaking.

A policy domain is the set of all policies and interests for a given policy area, which are bounded by a set of institutional rules and interactions that govern the policymaking and implementation process. The feature that most distinguishes a domain from a network is a matter of structural-functional orientation. While domains are maintained by institutional rules (structure), networks are maintained by actors (Browne, 1995:xx). In other words, domains do not depend upon a single set of policy actors routinely meeting to influence policy. (8)

Several ideas are central to the notion of policy domains, which borrows some principles from Arthur Bentley's theory of groups (9) and Anthony Down's notion of policy space. (10) First, domains have a substantive focus, a clearly understood set of politically interrelated issues, programs and policies that, due to conflict, may have some social and economic inconsistencies (Browne, 1995:32). Second, the domain is defined by its focus and that is the reason for its existence (Browne, 1995:32). Third, policy options for the domain are formulated, advocated and selected by important and identifiable public and private sector actors with a direct interest in, but not necessarily jurisdiction over domain problems (Browne, 1995:32). Fourth, domain players are transient. Because of their convergence of interests around domain problems, the players must take the actions of one another into account – but not by participating in the domain in any permanent sense (Browne, 1995:32). Fifth, the bounds of the domain and the structure of organizations and players within it are shifting and open (Browne, 1995:32). Sixth, policy domains are permeable, with no rigid definition required for how much self-governance is needed to retain domain status (Browne, 1995:32). Finally, interactions are governed by shared policy space rather than shared values (Browne, 1995:33).

Individualism and Postreform Congress.

Browne's argument here is that Postreform Congress is member driven. With influence more widely shared under postreform procedures, rank-and-file members have become more comfortable in challenging one another and various legislative authorities (Browne, 1995:xix). According to Browne (1995:ix), individual members face an institutional uncertainty that gives them unprecedented ability to make highly personal choices on the basis of district interests. Consequently, Congress has changed in its policy responsiveness because of increased individualism and a more opportunity-rich policy environment (Browne, 1995:ix).

Uncertainty.

Browne's insights about uncertainty are perhaps the most striking, creative feature of his work. According to Browne, members of Congress must cope with uncertainty daily. The way members cope with uncertainty is by trying to reduce it. The most common strategy for uncertainty reduction in this regard is to "seek safety in the home district, by keeping selected home folks happy with the local effects of national public policymaking" (Browne, 1995:4).

It is a fundamental human trait to seek stability as a means of reducing uncertainty, however due to societal complexities, this is increasingly harder to achieve (Ackoff, 1981). According to Ackoff (1981:4):

Ackoff's depiction of uncertainty parallels Browne's arguments on uncertainty quite well. The intense interaction of forces that Browne (1995) frequently comments about dovetails nicely with Ackoff's description of the "increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of individuals, groups, organizations, institutions, and societies" shown above. Likewise, Browne notes that the reason for uncertainty emanates from the fact that legislators must cope with an "intense, interplay" of competing forces that vie for their attention at home and in Washington. Any kind of speculation, of course, carries with it a set of risks. According to Browne (1995:4):

Uncertainty is exacerbated by concern over, who controls the policy agenda? (Browne, 1995:89). Browne (1995:89) points out that concern over agenda heightens uncertainty and escalates district importance. Thus, members must weigh demands and strategically select those "fights" that promise the best personal returns. Positive publicity regarding good policy also helps enhance the pay-off and reduce uncertainty. So, how do issues get selected? According to three staffers that Browne (1995:88) interviewed:

Two features of policy domains are strongly related to member uncertainty: First, the bounds of the domain and the structure of organizations and players within it are shifting and open (Browne, 1995:32); and second, policy domains are permeable structures, with no rigid definition required for how much self-governance is needed to retain domain status (Browne, 1995:32). These properties, in particular, create high levels of uncertainty, as explained below by Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984:80). (Substitute domain for each occurrence of organization).

Summary and Conclusions.

As a whole, Cultivating Congress is an excellent book. The inclusion of comparative data for other policy domains would afford even greater strength to Browne's arguments, however. Browne focused solely on agriculture policy and that raises some necessary questions about the generalizability of his findings. Nonetheless, Browne has opened the door for some interesting future initiatives. By his own admission, he feels that further exploration is needed, so that we can better understand what generates shared interests in politics and how these relationships are shaped (Browne, 1995:221).

Although Browne's perspective is that of political scientist, the book has value for a broader readership than merely that of public policy pundits. (11) His treatment of agriculture policy chronicles the interdependencies of institutional rules, politics, programs, administration, and behaviors; and therefore is an important contribution to the diverse body of literature found today in public administration. In particular, it is significant to the field of public administration because of the questions it raises about the long-held thoughts concerning bureaucratic autonomy in policymaking. Browne's work suggests the ascent of a new, powerful institution, one that has put a crack in the highly recognized stronghold of bureaucrats and interests. This new-sprung force is that of legislative staff experts and district influences (constituents). (12)

If Browne's understanding of policymaking does indeed extend beyond the agricultural policy domain into other realms, future research should reveal the roles of public administrators and interest groups to be far less important in policymaking than previously believed. (See note 12.) By the same token, Browne's findings raise some interesting questions about committee staff accountability, constituency ties, resolution of competing interests, and the greater social good. For instance, do the same concerns over agency capture apply to staffers and district influences (i.e., staff seizure)?

Further examination is necessary to determine the answers to such questions, however, Browne's work brings us one step closer to understanding who cultivates public policy and pursuant to what conditions.

Notes

1. The idea of policymaking as a game is hardly a novelty and it has its rightful place with other policy models in the political scientist's analytical tool kit, e.g., elite, rational, incremental, group, etc. It is a model of decision making that depicts how determinations are made in competitive situations (Dye, 1987). Players are anybody with well-defined goals, capable of "rational action." The idea of a game is that decision makers are involved in choices that are interdependent. Players adjust their conduct to reflect not only their own desires and abilities but also expectations about what others will do. Since the conditions of game theory are seldom approximated in real life, Dye (1987:38) notes the real utility of game theory in policy analysis is in suggesting interesting questions and providing a vocabulary to deal with conflict situations, which is evidenced in Browne's employment of the policy player – policy game metaphor. Return to your place in the document.

2. Outsiders are the president, political appointees, other interest groups, or legislators not on the committees in question. Return to your place in the document.

3. Ripley and Franklin describe routine policy as that which is not entangled in a high degree of conflict. Triangle participants are fluent in the selected policy area and "quietly efficient in shaping it to their liking." (Ripley and Franklin, 1991:6-8). Return to your place in the document.

4. Ripley and Franklin state that participation in iron triangles offers the most pervasive and effective channel for interest group impact on policy. (Ripley and Franklin, 1991:8). Return to your place in the document.

5. Ripley and Franklin state that "the existence of subgovernments has been documented in a number of studies of American government," yet only cite three instances – hardly a bounty of proof for their assertion. This seems to agree with Browne's argument that empirical evidence generally fails to substantiate the iron triangle phenomenon, except in isolated cases. (Browne, 1995:13; Ripley and Franklin, 1991:7). Return to your place in the document.

6. Browne would like to purge iron triangles from the study of policy. He feels that the concept has outlived its usefulness and he scoffs at "a whole new generation of scholars [who] tinker endlessly with [the triangle metaphor], reshaping triangles into hexagons and even transitory clouds." (Browne, 1995:12). Return to your place in the document.

7. Browne's text is based on three stages of interviews that Browne conducted between the years of 1991 and 1993, with congressional members and their staffs concerning issues that make up the "agricultural policy domain" (Browne, 1995:223-245). During the first stage, respondents were asked to specify the issues that consumed the most amount of staff time and held the highest personal priority with the initiating member. The second stage of the study examined information sources external to Congress. Respondents were asked to identify principal sources for information and to rate the relative importance of constituents, interest groups, agency officials, and the media to decisionmaking (e.g., issues pursued and positions taken). The third stage of the study examined information sources internal to Congress. Once again respondents were asked to judge the relative importance of interactions and relationships to their decisionmaking. Additional data considered germane to the analysis were also collected, including details on demographics, congressional tenure, subcommittee involvement, partisan status, and any other facts that might lend some insight into the characteristics that influence the issue interests of members.

   Browne concluded that the joint power of bureaucrats and interests in the agriculture policy arena have given way to a new force – that of legislative staff experts and district influences (constituents). For more on Browne's methodology, see the appendix in Cultivating Congress (Browne, 1995:223-245). Return to your place in the document.

8. The context for Browne's analysis is the policy domain. Browne (1995:xx) describes a domain as "a policy area of government with its own substantive focus." Domains are defined by a common set of issues, policies, and institutions that are treated as a single entity by government. They differ from networks in that no single group of players need meet to shape policy decisions. While networks are maintained by players, domains are maintained by rules. Thus, "agricultural policy is a domain of interest bounded by the prevailing institutional order of congressional committee and administrative agency jurisdictions as well as by the integrative mechanisms of the budgetary process" (Browne, 1995:xx). For more on agriculture as a policy domain, see Browne (1995:22-39). Return to your place in the document.

9. Bentley's theory suggests that policy players do not network just because they are organized or in a formal position to be involved. Rather, networking goes on as an expression of shared interest (Browne, 1995:32). Browne employs the Bentleyian argument to build a domain theory of policy participation. He writes (Browne, 1995:38):

   ..

   [Domain networking] exists as interest behavior, bringing numerous policy players together because of their immediate concern for mutual goals. No institutionally structured basis for networking needs exist, as traditional theory implied. Networking...is dependent on a public policy base that exists at the bounded domain level. Networks themselves are only situational and temporary arrangements that gather around that base. Domains, in contrast, are rule driven and exist because the general purposes of an aggregated set of public policies are commonly understood. Return to your place in the document.

   ....

10. Downs (1967) conceived of the idea of policy space to explain the concept of a bureau's functional territoriality. According to Downs, each function performed by a bureau has a place in policy space, and a bureau with many functions has many simultaneous locations in policy space. In effect, there is an incessant jockeying for position in policy space, as each bureau or other social agent struggles to defend or extend its existing borders. The struggle for territorial control among bureaus is analogous to the struggle for autonomy. (Downs, 1967:211-222).

    Browne uses the idea of policy space to help account for internal conflict. Under other theories, such as the triangle metaphor, conflict is avoided because it would allow outsiders to intervene in policy affairs. The domain concept, however, assumes nothing about mutually supportive relationships because shared policy space rather than shared values govern interactions. (Browne,1995:32-33).Return to your place in the document.

11. Over the past century, the important paradigms in public administration have hailed from a number of different perspectives. Taken together, these perspectives are the "defining pillars" of public administration (Golembiewski, 1977; Henry, 1989). Whether one is an observer of political institutions and policy implementation, a public management disciple, or an organization theory scholar, Browne's book has important implications. Return to your place in the document.

12. Other studies confirm that congressional staffers wield significant levels of influence in the policymaking process (Kingdon, 1983; Henry, 1989:14). Browne's basic findings, particularly those about local concerns and domain politics, attach another dimension to this understanding of staff power and also cast bureaucratic discretionary power in a different light. According to Browne (1995:159):

    ....

    The representation of constituents by district appears to be a more critical policymaking variable than before. ...[Members of Congress] and their staffs have a somewhat general disregard for agencies on anything more than routine matters. Return to your place in the document.

References

• Ackoff, Russell L. (1981). "The Nature of a System," in Creating the Corporate Future. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

• Berry, Jeffrey M. (1989). Interest Group Society. Harper Collins Publishers.

• Browne, William P. (1995). Cultivating Congress: Constituents, Issues, and Interests in Agricultural Policymaking. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

• Downs, Anthony (1967). Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

• Dye, Thomas R. (1987). Understanding Public Policy. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

• Golembiewski, Robert T. (1977). Public Administration as a Developing Discipline, Part I: Perspectives on Past and Present. New York: Marcel Dekker.

• Heclo, Hugh (1978): "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in King, Anthony ed., The New American Political System. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute: 87-124.

• Henry, Nicholas (1989). Public Administration and Public Affairs. Fourth Edition. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

• Hrebiniak, Lawrence G. and William F. Joyce (1984). Implementing Strategy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.

• Johnson, Cathy Marie (1992). The Dynamics of Conflict Between Bureaucrats and Legislators. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

• Kingdon, John W. (1983). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little Brown.

• Mandell, Myrna P. (1988). "Intergovernmental Management in Interorganizational Networks: A Revised Perspective." International Journal of Public Administration 11(2):393-416.

• Marin, Bernd and Renate Mayntz (1991). "Introduction: Studying Policy Networks," in Marin, Bernd and Renate Mayntz, eds., Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

• Meier, Kenneth J. (1993). Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government. Belmont: Wadsworth, Inc.

• O'Toole, Laurence J., Jr. (1989). "The Public Administrator's Role in Setting the Policy Agenda," in Perry, James L., ed., Handbook of Public Administration. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers:131-146.

• Ripley, Randall B. and Grace A. Franklin (1991). Congress, The Bureaucracy and Public Policy. Belmont: Wadsworth, Inc.

• Rourke, Francis E. (November/December 1992). "Responsiveness and Neutral Competence in American Bureaucracy." Public Administration Review 52:539-546.

• Thurber, James A., (1991). "Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in American Politics," in Cigler, Allan J. and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics. Washington D.C.: A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc.: 319-343.

Reprinted with permission of the Southern Public Administration Education Foundation, Inc.